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Botnet Reverse Engineering and Call Sequence Recovery
Prosenjit Sinha
The focus on computer security has increased due to the ubiquitous use of Internet.
Criminals mistreat the anonymous and insidious traits of Internet to commit monetary on-
line fraud, theft and extortion. Botnets are the prominent vehicle for committing online
crimes. They provide platform for a botmaster to control a large group of infected Internet-
connected computers. Botmaster exploits this large group of connected computers to send
spam, commit click fraud, install adware/spyware, ﬂood speciﬁc network from distributed
locations, host phishing sites and steal personal credentials. All these activities pose se-
rious threat for individuals and organizations. Furthermore, the situation demands more
attention since the research and the development of underground criminal industry is faster
than security research industry. To cope up against the ever growing botnet threats, security
researchers as well as Internet-users need cognizance on the recent trends and techniques
of botnets. In this thesis, we analyze in-depth by reverse engineering two prominent bot-
nets namely, Mariposa and Zeus. The ﬁndings of the analysis may foster the knowledge of
security researchers in multiple dimensions to deal with the botnet issue. To enhance the
abstraction and visualization techniques of reverse engineering, we develop a tool which is
used for detailed outlook of call sequences.
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The remarkable growth of the Internet technologies over the past few years changes the
lifestyle of most people. The widespread use of the Internet has altered the pattern of the
world from simple household level to businesses. The traditional ways of marketing, com-
munication, education, and broadcasting are replaced by web-based applications and online
systems. People in the 21st century are more akin to perform transactions online at their
own favorable hours. However, the Internet applications are mistreated by perpetrators and
hackers for committing different kinds of crimes. The extensive use of Internet motivates
the malicious activities which took place over the past several years. Formerly malicious
programs have been classiﬁed as viruses, worms or Trojan horses based on their behav-
iors. Nowadays, rather than being in a speciﬁc group, malware is often versatile and even
equipped with multiple threats. In the majority of Internet mediated cybercrimes, the used
victimization tactics vary from simple anonymity to identity theft and impersonation.
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The advent of botnets further exacerbates the situation. A botnet is a term that desig-
nates a network of autonomous software robots (bots) compromising computers which are
controlled by a botmaster running a command-and-control center. Botnets have become
a severe threat to the Internet security by constituting an ideal platform of a wide variety
of cyber attacks targeting identity theft, spamming, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
extortion and so on [83]. For example, Mariposa botnet comprised of 13 millions infected
machines is capable to perform DDoS extortions and identity theft operations. Although
the existence of botnets has been a known fact for a long time, the recent growth of cy-
bercrimes and cyber-warfares mediated by botnets has attracted the attention of IT security
researchers.
As a result, a surge of interest has been expressed in understanding, analyzing, detect-
ing, defaming, and preventing botnet attacks. In this context, the battle between hack-
ers/cyber criminals and IT security experts takes the allure of a non-terminating cat and
mouse ﬁght. In order to counter the escalation of hackers’ ideas and innovations, security
experts have to understand the threats and the employed technologies, and then design and
implement techniques to mitigate the risk underlying these threats.
1.1 Motivations
Botnets are the root cause of many cyber crimes. They impose a severe threat to Internet
users due to their central controlling capability over a huge number of infected machines
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distributed around the globe. As of October 2009, Zeus botnet is estimated to have in-
fected 3.6 millions computers [8]. Botnets are the main weapons of the cyber criminals
to conduct money-making fraudulent activities. Such activities can be identiﬁed as spam
distribution, hosting phishing sites, identity theft, click fraud, DDoS extortions and dis-
tributing unwanted software. According to MessageLabs [115], the average spam rate for
the year 2010 is 89.1% and botnets account for 80-90% of all spams sent globally. Rus-
tock [57], one of the dominant botnet, is solely responsible for sending 44 billions spams
per day in the latter half of 2010 with over one million bots under its control [115]. Botnets
are used extensively for distributing malware. In year 2009, 1 in 284.2 emails containing
malware [115].
Botnets equipped with techniques like polymorphism, metamorphism, encryption, ob-
fuscation and trafﬁc encryption are hardly detectable by anti-viruses. With the help of
polymorphic engine, botmaster can get a complete new version of the bot by a click of the
mouse. In 2009, Symantec observed 90,000 unique variants of basic Zeus toolkits [18].
Mariposa bot toolkit comes with a built in polymorphic engine which enables botmaster to
create encrypted bot code using different keys.
Despite signiﬁcant research on botnet detection, defence, and eradication, the problem
still persists in the Internet world. Bot writers constantly enrich their tools with new so-
phisticated techniques. For example, a new botnet URLZone [2] is capable to alter the
online bank statement so that the victim cannot detect that his money has been stolen. Zeus
botnet also has a similar capability of hiding transactions from the targeted web sites. The
capabilities of the botnets reach such level that now, it targets Supervisory Control and
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Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. According to Symantec Corporation, a botnet called
Stuxnet [107] searches for industrial control systems which are also known as SCADA
systems. If it ﬁnds any SCADA systems running on the compromised computer, it tries to
steal code and design projects. It is also capable to take advantage of the programming soft-
ware interface to upload its own code to the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) [107].
Considering the sophistication of botnet capabilities, there is a desideratum to understand
the inner working of the new botnets. It is important to disclose the details of how botnets
work to help the security community in general to build better defense mechanisms.
The two most prominent techniques for malware analysis are behavioral analysis and
code analysis. In behavioral analysis, the activities of the malware are examined by execut-
ing the malware in a controlled environment where they are observed with some specialized
software. Some of the commonly used software tools for behavioral analysis are CWSand-
box [70], NormanSandbox [94] and Anubis [5]. The limitations of these tools are: 1) they
cannot provide a ﬁne-grained information of register and memory access, 2) they cannot
uncover certain hidden behavior, and 3) they cannot give information about the used trafﬁc
and the binary encryption algorithms. On the other side, reverse code analysis involves con-
verting machine code into human readable assembly code and then analyzing it. Reverse
code analysis can be either static using a disassember1 or dynamic with the combination of
a debugger and a disassembler.
Reverse engineering is complex and time-consuming particularly in obfuscated code-
bases involving malware. Currently the lack of modern visualization tools of assembly
1Disassembler is used to translate machine code into assembly code
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code further exacerbates this problem. Comprehension of low-level issues such as malware
threats often relies on dated user interfaces that actually inhibit navigation and exploration
of large code bases. These user interfaces often fail to exploit visualization techniques that
could signiﬁcantly alleviate cognitive overhead. For example, the ways IDA Pro [74] rep-
resents a call diagram is not helpful for the analyzer. Actually the diagram is static with
no supported execution traces or external calls. Additionally, it does not support call trace
and call ordering nor does it indicate if a call occurs more than once. An initial usabil-
ity survey reveals that better analysis of control ﬂow is particularly critical for program
comprehension in the malware domain [48].
1.2 Objectives
The purpose of the research is to ﬁnd out the trends and the techniques used in botnet
domain to perpetrate online crimes. We also intend to ﬁnd out techniques that can ease the
process of reverse malware analysis. More precisely, the objectives of our research are as
follows:
• To discuss state-of-the-art techniques regarding malware and malware analysis for
providing details about the contemporary techniques of reverse engineering.
• To provide the reverse engineering ﬁndings of two prominent botnets namely, Mari-
posa and Zeus to explore the techniques that are used in current botnets.
• To design and develop a control ﬂow visualization tool for the analysis of low-level




The main contributions of the thesis consist of the reverse engineering ﬁndings of two
prominent botnets and the implementation of a low-level visualization tool. In more details,
our contributions are as follows:
• The comparative study of the state-of-the-art techniques of malware and correspond-
ing reverse malware analysis.
• The comprehensive reverse engineering results of Mariposa [108] and Zeus [52] bot-
nets. The insights from this work are meant to illustrate the know-how used in current
botnet technologies and enable the elaboration of analysis, detection and prevention
techniques.
• The design and the implementation of a tool for reverse engineering, which we named
Tracks [48]. Tracks works as a plugin of IDA Pro and supports the reverse anal-
ysis process by facilitating and providing visual issues like navigation history and




The rest of the Thesis is organized as follows. We present an overview of botnets and a
comparative study of reverse engineering techniques together with the current literature in
Chapter 2. Using reverse engineering, we analyze Mariposa and Zeus botnets and present
the ﬁndings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. In Chapter 5, we present the design
and the implementation of the proposed visualization tool. Concluding remarks as well as
a discussion of future works are reported in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Malware and Malware Analysis
We present an overview of malware and its counterpart malware analysis. In the ﬁrst part
of this chapter, we introduce the various types of malicious software focusing primarily
on botnets. Then, we discuss the sophisticated techniques that are used in new types of
malware to achieve their nefarious functionalities. At the end, we talk about different tech-
niques of malware reverse engineering including behavioral analysis, static and live code
analysis. We also converse about anti-debugging tricks that are generally used by malware
writers to make the debugging process strenuous. Moreover, we present a literature review
on related topics at the end of the chapter.
2.1 Overview of Malware
Malicious code is fragments of programs that can affect the conﬁdentiality, the integrity,
the data, control ﬂow, and the functionality of a system without the explicit knowledge and
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the consent of the user [56]. Malware can get access to the compromised machine, and
send back important information to the malware controller. Over the time, the motivation
of malware changes from fun to multi-million dollar business. In the early stage of the
personal computer era, computer viruses were created for fun and to show the programming
skills. First malicious virus, namely Brain [116], appeared after the appearance of personal
computers in 1986. Brain infects the boot sector of the ﬂoppy drive and propagates when
a user boots a machine from the infected ﬂoppy. Two years after the appearance of Brain,
another worm calledMorris [105] infected 6000 computers. Highly propagating worms with
various spreading mechanisms were seen in mid to late 90s. This is the time when Internet
and personal computers were getting their popularity, and people started to use electronic
mail system as a mean of communication. Worms like Melissa [69], i love you [85], Anna
Kurnikova [65], SoBig [120] and Mydoom [90, 114] spread via electronic system in that era.
The online ﬁnancial transaction boom in the business world in the late 90s changed the
goals of malware writers such that to focus on organized and coordinated ﬁnancial attacks.
As a result, malware like Trojans, backdoors and botnets came to effect. Criminals are now
more inclined to use controlled and combined power of botnets that spreads all over the
globe to earn money. In the following, we present a brief description of some prominent
forms of malwares.
2.1.1 Viruses
In IT world, the term "virus" is generally used to refer all types of malware. Viruses are
self-replicating malware that can replicate itself for spreading purposes and run in the host
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machine for the intent of malicious activities. Viruses are the primitive form of malware.
Viruses ﬁrst appeared in 1970 in ARPANET [6]. When the computer networking is in its
childhood state, most viruses spread via removable devices mainly ﬂoppy disks. Some
viruses spread by infecting executables and others by infecting boot sectors. The boom
in personal computers in 1980 led to the corresponding boom of viruses. More people
get in touch with personal computers, more they gain knowledge about its mechanism.
Some users apply their knowledge to create programs with malicious intent. Macro viruses
written in scripting languages became common in the mid 90s. Most of those viruses target
Microsoft Word and Excel to infect and spread throughout.
2.1.2 Worms
A worm is fundamentally similar to a virus in the sense that it is a self-replicating malicious
program. The difference is that a worm replicates using networks and the replication pro-
cess does not require any human interaction. A worm breaches a system by exploiting the
vulnerabilities of the operating systems or applications. Once inside, it tries to propagate
itself to other systems using networks. Some of the most common worms are: Storm [78],
Code Red [60] and Slammer [61].
2.1.3 Trojans
Trojan horses generally known as Trojans are the malicious programs in the form of in-
nocuous programs. A Trojan is a harmless tool that is delivered in a normal way which
in fact contains malicious contents in it. The main difference between Trojans and viruses
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is, Trojans can not replicate like viruses. Trojans can disguise itself in victim’s machine in
the form of a screen saver or a collection of artworks coming in via an email attachment.
Therefore, along with the legitimate contents, a well-designed virus or bot can lurk. After
executing, it may open a backdoor or download other malicious contents from the Internet.
2.1.4 Rootkits
A rootkit is a malware component consisting of small and useful programs that allow an
attacker to maintain administrative access. In other words, a rootkit is a malicious program
that allows a permanent and undetectable presence on a computer [76]. The main idea of
rootkit is to hide the presence of malicious activities and data in the system. Most rootkits
are capable of hiding ﬁles and directories whereas others are used for snifﬁng packets from
networks.
2.1.5 Botnets
The remarkable and diverse growth of Internet changes the motivation of malicious activ-
ities over the past several years from vandalism, script kiddie and demonstration of pro-
gramming knowledge to ﬁnancial gain. Nowadays, increasing number of proﬁt-oriented
malware activities like, identity theft and DDoS are backed by organized crime gang. This
involvement of ﬁnancial motivation boosts up the use of sophisticated techniques in bot
code and make the task of IT security more difﬁcult. Botnets are identiﬁed as the latest
threats in Internet security. Unlike other malware, botnets are organized in a hierarchical
manner with a central control. A bot is a computer program installed in a user machine,
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and botnet is a network of bots. After being installed in the victims’ machine in a clandes-
tine way, the bot communicates covertly with a Command and Control (C&C) server. The
botmaster, who is the controller of the botnet, issues commands to the C&C server which
then relays the commands to the bots in order to be executed in the compromised machine.
Botnet Architecture
The foremost feature that keeps botnet apart from other types of malware is its control
mechanism. Thousands or millions of machines hijacked by a speciﬁc botnet are con-
trolled by a central authority generally known as botmaster or botherder. The botmaster
issues command on a location known as Command and Control (C&C) server. The C&C
server is crucial for a botnet as it is the platform for the botmaster to deliver commands
to the zombies. Upon compromising the victim machine, each bot tries to communicate
with the C&C server in order to receive commands from the botmaster. There are some
works on the taxonomy [62] of botnets, using properties like C&C infrastructure, propaga-
tion mechanism or exploitation mechanism. Considering the topology of the C&C server,
botnets can be classiﬁed into:
• Centralized. It is the oldest type of topology. In this arrangement all zombies are
controlled from a central server. This single point (C&C server) is responsible for the
communication between the botmaster and the zombies. Botmaster issues commands
to the C&C server and the server distributes the commands to the bots. In most cases,
the communication between the bot and the C&C server is based on either Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) or Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Formerly, botmasters
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were more akin to use IRC server for C&C because of its minimal effort and its easy
administration. They used to host the IRC server in "bullet proof" hosting1 services
or in one of the compromised machines. To circumvent the single point failure, IRC
botnets use a list of IP addresses of servers. If bot does not receive any reply from
one server it will automatically switch and try to communicate with another server
from the list.
Recently, HTTP is getting popularity as botnet C&C communication protocol [84].
Use of HTTP has several advantages over IRC. Most of the organizations conﬁg-
ure their ﬁrewall to accept communication on port 80. The opposite is the true for
IRC, IRC trafﬁc are blocked in most organizations. In HTTP botnet, most of the
cases attackers use hard-coded domain name to reach the HTTP server. They use
Fast-ﬂux [77] techniques to evade themselves from detection. All communications
are encrypted for anonymity. Additionally botnets can use User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) as the communication protocol. For instance, Mariposa bot uses UDP proto-
col to communicate with with C&C server [108]. Advantages of using UDP as the
C&C communication protocol is discussed in Chapter 3.
The big advantage of centralized topology is its simplicity and low latency. On the
contrary, it is highly vulnerable to detection and failure [88,89] because of their cen-
tralized structure. If the central server is detected, botmaster will loose the control
from the whole army whereas on the decentralized architecture, if one server is de-
tected, botmaster will lose only a portion of his army.
1A service that guarantees the availability of service even if it is found to be malicious or illegal.
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• Decentralized. Command and Control servers are the vulnerable point in centralized
architecture, from the attacker’s point of view. Botmaster will lose the control of all
his bots once the command and control servers are shut down by the defenders. De-
fenders can identify the IP address of the command and control server by analyzing
the trafﬁc [51], or the list of the IP addresses can be retrieved by reverse engineering
a captured bot. Shadowservers [16] also provide feeds about the C&C server IPs. To
counter those potential drawbacks, botmasters are switching to decentralized topol-
ogy. In decentralized topology, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology is used to control
botnets. The pivotal issue in P2P is the absence of central C&C server. As there is no
central server, there is no central point of failure. Peer-to-Peer trafﬁc is also harder to
detect because of the absence of a central server. However, the compromised bot still
needs the bootstrapping2 process to join the botnet. The newly infected machines
need to know at least one bot to receive information as well as commands from
the botmaster. Peer-to-Peer bots mainly use different implementation of Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) to organize the bots. Some bots use Chord [113] implementation
and others use Kademlia [87]. Examples of botnets that use Peer-to-Peer as com-
munication protocol are Slapper [46], Sinit [28], Phatbot [27], Peacomm [98] and
Nugache [101].
• Hybrid. Wang et al have proposed a new topology of botnets [119] which is the
mongrel of centralized and decentralized topologies. They have tried to propose a
structure that eliminates the weak points of both centralized and decentralized botnet




Over time, the motive of the cyber crime has changed. Today, large fractions of cyber
crimes are proﬁt-driven [83]. Botnets are also evolved considering the ﬁnancial issue as
the central driving force. With the control of millions of compromised machines, which
are ready to download and execute anything on the ﬂy, botmaster is capable to use them
for an array of malicious purposes to earn money. Some of the commonly used malicious
activities are listed below:
• Information Stealing. Most of the botnets are equipped with spyware capabilities.
Capabilities like keylogging, screenshot taking, packet capturing, data theft and browser
tracking can be used to steal almost all types of personal data from users [72]. Soft-
ware keyloggers are used to log the keystrokes from the keyboards of the compro-
mised machines. Keylogging even turns the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encrypted
application vulnerable because data is logged as plain text before it goes to any en-
cryption. Some of the commonly targeted data types are: Credit card information,
Paypal [26] and eBay [24] credentials, email and Instant Messenger (IM) credentials,
personal information and Windows protected storage information. Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) estimates that botnets caused 20 million dollars in losses in
2005, out of which one of the scam evaded a Midwest ﬁnancial institution out of
millions [33] .
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• Spam Distribution. Most of the spam messages are generated from botnets and some
of them like Strom [78] and Bobax [112] are maintained for spamming only. Accord-
ing to Cisco 2008 annual report, more than 90% of the emails exchanged over the
Internet are spam [7]. In this report, they stated that by mid-2008, the Srizbi [110]
botnet had a stable population of 260,000 host computers and was responsible for
the distribution of as much as 60 percent of the world’s spam (a staggering 80 billion
messages per day). In May 2009, in a 24-hour period around the U.S. Memorial Day
(May 25, 2009), just over 249 billion spam messages were sent.
• Registry and Hard Drive Searching. Botnets often include functionality to search
valuable information from the hard drive or registry to send them to the C&C server
[72]. Generally targeted information includes email addresses, CD keys, instant mes-
senger contact information and Windows protected storage contents.
• Hosting of Phishing Sites. Botmasters use compromised machine to host phishing
sites. Sometimes they rent part of their network to other interested parties to conduct
such activities. Botmasters usually try to bafﬂe gullible users through spam emails
and using social engineering techniques to visit their vague sites. A portion of users
get trapped and reveal their personal information like credit card numbers to attack-
ers. In 2009, Semantec detected 59,526 phishing hosts which is an increase of 7
percent over 2008 [18].
• Click Fraud. In this type of attack, attacker generates proﬁt by directing his zombies
to click on some speciﬁc ads. The botmaster earns some money for each click. With
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the enormous number of zombies around the world, a formidable amount of money
cab be earned through click fraud. There are some botnets with the sole purpose of
click fraud for instance, Clickbot [63]. Clicking agents, e.g., Clickmaster, I-Faker,
FakeZilla, etc, are also available for purchase. According to ClickForensics, click
fraud alone amounted to 12.7% of all pay-per-click advertisements in the second
quarter of 2009 [58].
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack. Most of the botnets are equipped with
the power of performing Distribute Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The idea be-
hind the attack is to request services to a speciﬁc server from all around the globe
using compromised machines resulting in slowing or stopping the capability of pro-
viding services. The techniques that are most commonly used for performing DDoS
are UDP, SYN, ICMP, and ECHO ﬂooding [72]. The accumulated power of bot-
net distributed all over the globe is the weapon of the botmaster to perform DDoS.
Most of the recent DDoS attacks are performed using botnets. For example, in May
2007, a DDoS attack was launched against the Estonian government and commercial
Websites [64].
• Gateway and Proxy Functionalities. Botmasters often use the compromised ma-
chines to act as Proxy servers in order to avoid detection. Some of the common
proxy functionalities include HTTP proxy, Socks proxy, IRC bounce, and Generic
port redirection [72].
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Botnet Creation and Propagation
It is a common thought that building a botnet needs a formidable amount of technical
knowledge and expertise. However, with the presence of numerous online help and hacker
forums, nowadays, it is comparatively easier to build up a botnet. A wealth of information
is available for download on hacking sites. Graphical user interface (GUI) based exploit
packages are available to compromise systems. Besides that, attackers do not even need to
write their own piece of malware. Ready to deploy malware are available to buy online.
Malicious toolkits like Zeus and Butterﬂy are available online to buy along with customer
support [31]. Distributor of Butterﬂy botnet offers different price for different modules.
After the purchase or creation of a botnet toolkit, the next responsibility of the master
is to distribute the bot. Underground community share IP ranges to determine the target
netblocks. For example, criminals are more akin to attack netblocks with broadband access,
highly available, less monitored and vulnerable systems [71]. In the following, we discuss
the most common techniques that are used to spread the botnet infection:
• Peer-to-Peer Network. Peer-to-Peer ﬁle sharing networks are used extensively for
botnet propagation. The general technique is to copy the malware in the shared folder
of the P2P application as an innocuous program with a legitimate name. For example,
Mariposa botnet searches the registry for the installed peer-to-peer programs [108].
If there is any installed P2P application, mariposa copies itself into the associated
shared folder using attractive names. For example, the crack ﬁle of a favorite game.
Mariposa receives the name of the folder from the botmaster [108].
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• Instant Messenger. Instant messengers are popular choice for attackers. They employ
the social engineering techniques to spread malware/botnet with the help of instant
messengers. Some of the botnets hook the Windows send and receive functions so
that they can get access to all the messages sent and received from the messenger.
As the send function being hooked, malware can replace any message sent by the
user. It can send any unsolicited message or link that ultimately takes the user to the
malicious Websites or it may begin the download and the installation process of the
malware.
• Email/Spam. In this type of attack, gullible users are prompted to open an attachment
or a link. The system becomes compromised by the malware if the user click on the
link.
• Vulnerability Exploitation. Using the vulnerability of software system is another
method of botnet propagation. Even though software vendors try to update patches
when the vulnerability is discovered, some systems remain susceptible because of
the improper administration.
• Storage Medium. Storage medium like USB drives are widely used to spread bot-
nets. USB storage drives (e.g. thumb or jump drives) are ubiquitous in the modern
workplace. They can be purchased at nearly all retail stores for less than the cost of
a burger. The intent of USB infection is to exploit the seemingly benign nature of
the Windows Autorun feature [91]. When an external storage device is attached with
the system, Windows uses the autorun.inf ﬁle of that device to know what autorun
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action it may perform with this device. A simpliﬁed autorun.inf ﬁle is shown in
Figure 2.1. The open ﬁeld speciﬁes the path and ﬁle name of the application that
AutoRun launches when a user inserts a disc in the drive. The action ﬁeld speciﬁes
the text that is used in the autoplay dialogue box. When a machine get infected, the
infection instruments the operating system so that it can receive notiﬁcation from
the operating system whenever a storage medium is attached with the system. As a
consequence, the malware copies the malcode into the storage medium and tweaks




action=Open folder to view files
shell\open\command=start.bat
Figure 2.1: Simple Autorun File
2.2 Sophistication of Botnet Techniques
Code evolution is common in malware industry. The evolution is destined to avoid detec-
tion and also to make the malware analysis process hard and strenuous. Modern malware
is often equipped with sophisticated techniques like: encryption, polymorphism, metamor-
phism, multi-threaded execution, stealth techniques, anti-analysis Techniques etc. In the
following we detail some of these techniques.
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2.2.1 Encryption
One of the easiest ways to hide malware functionality is to use encrypted code. Nowadays,
malware often comes with encrypted codebases which makes the task of static analysis
almost impossible. Encrypted malware executable ﬁrst runs a decryption routine which
decrypts other part of the malware and convert the encrypted codebase into meaningful
machine code. Multiple layers of encrption/decryption is also common in order to make
the analysis of the malware more complicated.
2.2.2 Polymorphism
In polymorphism, a malware code mutates in a way that it maintains its original function-
ality. The simplest approach of polymorphism is to use encryption with random encryption
keys. Every time when a malware codebase is generated, it encrypts itself using a differ-
ent key. Polymorphism technique is extremely useful to bafﬂe signature-based malware
detection techniques.
2.2.3 Metamorphism
The idea of metamorphism is to alter the whole executable when a new copy is generated.
Instead of encrypting the program body with a different key, metamorphism creates a new
executable with the same functionality by altering the whole malicious program, including
the metamorphic engine itself. The alteration can be achieved by using:
• Instruction ordering
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• Control ﬂow changing
2.2.4 Multithreading
As the computing power of personal computer rises in a remarkable level, malware writ-
ers start showing their intention on multithreaded execution of malware. For example,
W32/ratos [49] launches more than one kernel mode in order to perform several tasks si-
multaneously.
2.2.5 Stealth Techniques
Stealthiness and low-noise is the ultimate target of malware. While running in the victim
machine, malware should hide itself in order not to be detected. Malware often uses several
stealth techniques to hide itself:
• File System. Hiding ﬁle system is critical for malware. Malware is commonly
equipped with functionalities to hide its critical ﬁles and directories from operat-
ing systems and other analysis tools. It may achieve the purpose either by installing
rootkits [121] or by using other sophisticated techniques.
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• Memory. Malware can distribute its functionality inside different legitimate pro-
cesses using code injection techniques. Malware can inject code into different Win-
dows processes and inter communicate using named pipes3. This makes malware
analysis extremely tough. As an example, Zeus botnet uses mass process infection
to distribute its functionality among several processes [52].
• Disk. A sector of the disk can be marked as bad by malware to restrict the access of
the operating systems. Malware can also store data or copy itself in locations that are
generally not used for data storage [116].
2.2.6 Anti-analysis Techniques
Criminals want to keep the functionality of their crimeware toolkit hidden. Anti-analysis
techniques are used to make the analysis of the crimeware impossible or hard for security
researchers. These anti-analysis techniques check if malware programs is executed under
a control environment (e.g. debugger, sandbox or honeypot). If the malware can detect
such environment, it aborts its execution. Few miscellaneous commonly used anti-analysis
techniques are discussed here:
• Time Checking. Malware often uses relative execution time information to detect
whether it runs under a debugger or not. For example, the GetTickCount API func-
tion is used to detect pauses in execution which in fact detects the presence of a
debugger. GetTickCount returns the elapsed time in milliseconds since the system
3A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one
or more pipe clients.
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started. Malware calls GetTickCount in two locations in the code and then calculates
the difference. A large difference indicates the presence of a debugger.
• Breakpoint Detection. A breakpoint is an indicator for the debugger to stop execu-
tion of the program. It can be either a software breakpoint or a hardware breakpoint.
When a user sets a breakpoint in a line of code, the debugger internally saves the
opcode and replaces it with the opcode 0xCC (INT3)4. When the debugged program
executes the INT3 instruction, it stops the execution and transfers the control to the
debugger’s corresponding exception handler. At this point, the debugger notiﬁes the
user that a breakpoint has been hit and concurrently it replaces the opcode 0xCC
with the original opcode that it has been saved previously. After executing the orig-
inal opcode, the debugger again saves the original instruction and replaces it with
0xCC. This action is for the persistency of breakpoints. Malware exploits software
breakpoint mechanism to detect debuggers. Malware incorporates 0xCC opcode in
the middle of a valid code to detect the presence of a debugger. If the program is
not running under a debugger then the execution of 0xCC will trigger the associated
exception handler and the execution will continue. On the other side, if it runs under
a debugger then execution of the 0xCC will cause to trigger the debugger signalling
a breakpoint.
Unlike software, hardware breakpoint is implemented with the help of CPU’s special
functionality. In x86 processor family, hardware breakpoint mechanism is achieved
with the help of special registers known as debug registers. There are eight reserved
4INT3 instruction generates a single step exception
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debug registers in x86 architecture (DR0 to DR7). The registers DR0 through DR3
contain addresses on which to break the execution while debugging. The DR7 regis-
ter is used to control the debugging process and DR6 is used to maintain the status.
The library function GetCurrentThreadContext is used to read the contents of debug
registers from the chip and then the contents of the registers can be compared with
0x00 to conﬁrm that there are no hardware breakpoints in the system.
2.3 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is the process of discovering the technological aspects of a device,
an object or a system through analysis of its structure, its function and its operation. The
term reverse engineering can be correlated with different things with different perspectives.
Software reverse engineering is one of the most intricate processes and it is comparable
with opening up an unknown box and looking inside it.
When we correlate binary executable with reverse engineering, the process is often
termed as Reverse Code Engineering (RCE). To get proﬁciency on the process of reverse
code engineering, one required to get a thorough understanding of computer systems spe-
cially the working methodology of operating systems. Moreover, it is very important to
understand the assembly language. Another important trait that is a prerequisite for the
analyzer is the perseverance, curiosity and desire to learn. According to Eldad Eilam [67],
the arts that are integrated with reverse engineering are: code breaking, puzzle solving,
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programming and logical analysis. In the rest of this chapter we focus on the various tech-
niques of reverse engineering and its related aspects.
2.3.1 Reversing Malicious Software
Dealing with malicious software is always challenging. The same is true with the reverse
engineering of malicious software. The advent of the Internet has changed the world of
computers dramatically. A computer user is not an isolated entity now. As long as some-
one is connected with the Internet, he can be the victim of security related hazards. Over
the last ten years, malware has reached a sophistication level such that it does not need
any human intervention at all to steal personal information and accumulate information to
a central location. The connection between reverse engineering and malware is quite inter-
esting. Reverse engineering is used extensively in both end of the malicious software chain.
Security experts as well as antivirus companies use reverse engineering to understand the
inner working of malware. On the other side, malware writers use reverse engineering to
locate the vulnerabilities in operating systems and other applications. They exploits uncov-
ered vulnerabilities in order to penetrate systems and thereby get unauthorized access to
victim’s machines. Reverse engineering of malicious executable can be achieved by con-
ducting behavioral analysis and reverse code analysis. The details on both type of analysis
are provided in the subsequent sections.
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2.3.2 Assembly Language
Assembly language is the human readable representation of the machine language. It is
used for the reverse engineering of binary executable. Every computer platform has its
own set of assembly instructions. In this thesis, we primarily focus on the Intel’s 32-bit
architecture (IA-32) which is based on Intel’s x86 CPU architecture. It is very important
to acquire a ﬁrm understanding of the assembly language in order to master in reverse
engineering.
2.3.3 Basic x86 Architecture
To perform reverse engineering, we need sufﬁcient amount of knowledge about assembly
language and the low level structure of the computer. We need to know how the registers
interact with each other and what their purposes are. On reversing a binary, most of the time
we need to look at the content of the registers and the assembly language together with a
description about the low-level architecture of computers. In the following, we provide a
brief overview about the low level architecture of computers.
Registers
The hardware components that are directly referred from assembly language are registers.
Registers are used as the temporary storage by microprocessors while executing instruc-
tions. To avoid accessing memory for every instruction, microprocessor uses registers as
the registers can be accessed without any performance penalty. IA-32 has eight 32-bit gen-
eral purpose registers: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, EBP, ESI, EDI and ESP. In addition to those
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Registers Description
EAX, EBX, EDX Used as general purpose register for arithmetic, logical and
boolean operations.
ECX Used as general purpose register but mainly as a counter for
repetitive instructions.
ESI, EDI Used for source and destination index for string operations.
EBP Used for base addresses to reference function arguments
(EBP+value) and local variables (EBP-value).
ESP Used to point to the current "top" of the stack; changes via
PUSH, POP, and other instructions.
EIP Used to point to the next instruction
Table 2.1: IA-32 General Purpose Registers
general purpose registers, IA-32 structure has a speciﬁc ﬂag register to preserve all types of
status information. This ﬂag register is generally known as EFLAGS register. The status of
this ﬂag register is vital to understand the functionality of the binary while reversing. Table
2.1 elaborates the general purposes of these registers.
Stack
Stack is a region of memory location used for short term storage of information. Registers
are used to store data that is used immediately by a processor whereas stack is used to store
slightly long term data. Stack memory resides in RAM as like any other memory. The only
separation between memory and stack is logical. Stack uses Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) data
structure where information is pushed or popped into the structure. Stack is generally used
during the execution of a process or a thread. Each process or thread has a reserved region
of memory as stack that is used frequently to store function parameters.
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Heap
The Heap is also an allocated region in memory. Unlike stack, heap is allocated dynami-
cally at runtime. At runtime, program requests for a block of memory and receives a pointer
of the allocated block (considering enough memory is available). From reverse engineering
point of view, heap allocation and freeing routine can be helpful to understand the overall
data layout of a program.
2.4 Miscellaneous Analysis
Before we discuss about the code analysis or behavioral analysis of a malware, it is impor-
tant to discuss about few miscellaneous analysis. In this section, we state few techniques
that are useful to get a primitive idea of a malware.
2.4.1 File Fingerprinting
Before starting deep inspection of a malware, it is wise to retrieve the unique identiﬁer or
the ﬁngerprint of the analyzed malware. This helps to detect any changes in code after the
analysis. At any time of the analysis, analyst can produce the hash value and check for any
changes in the malware. Fingerprint also helps in the dynamic analysis of malware. After
the execution, malware may remove itself from its previous location and get copied into
a new location. Fingerprinting information will help in such case to identify the malware.
Fingerprint of a malware sample can be taken by using the cryptographic hash of the ﬁle.
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Cryptographic hash algorithm like, SHA1, MD5 or SHA256 are commonly used for this
purpose. There are some free tools available to compute the cryptographic hashes.
2.4.2 AV Testing
Next step of analysis is to test the malware sample with anti viruses. This test can pro-
vide information about the potential dangers caused by the malware. Malware samples can
be submitted to speciﬁc anti virus vendors. There are some online services like, VirusTo-
tal [21], Jotti malware scan [34], and VirScan [20] that scan submitted malware against
numerous antiviruses and gives the accumulated results as a report.
2.4.3 String Analysis
Strings can help in some extent to understand the working of the malware. By analyzing
the embedded strings, analyzer can get a rough idea about the malware. Embedded strings
can easily be extracted using some string analysis tools. Some of these tools include: String
from Sysinternals [103], Bintext [35] from Foundstone and Hex Workshop [109]. Though,
it is easy to extract string from executables, string analysis is not effective for malware
executables with encrypted strings.
2.4.4 Packer Detection
Packers are programs that allow users encrypting the content of an executable. In its child-
hood, packers were used to shrink the size of executables for the maximum use of the space.
Afterwards, malware writers exploit the purpose of packers and starts using the artifact to
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conceal their malcode inside the armor. Packer takes the contents of an executable as an
input and then encrypts and encapsulates it inside another executable. This chain happens
more than once to make the task of analyzers more complex. When a packer encrypts an
executable program, it looks totally different from the original one. Packer program also in-
cludes a decryption routine to decrypt the packed executable and load the original program
into memory. Packers with the strength of polymorphism and metamorphism can serve as
the most effective weapon for the black hats. By a click of the mouse, malware authors
can get a new version of malware maintaining the same functionality but with completely
new structure. Few packer detection tools are available to detect packers, e.g., PEiD [30],
PE Detective [97], Mandiant Red Curtain [86], etc. Nowadays, malware writers often use
custom packers to avoid being detected by common packer detection tools.
2.5 Reverse Code Analysis
In reverse code analysis, machine code is converted into human readable format and then
analysis is continued with the converted code. There are two types of reverse code analysis:
static code analysis and live code analysis. In both types of analysis, disassemblers and
decompilers are used to convert the machine code into human readable format.
2.5.1 Static Code Analysis
There is no execution of code in the static code analysis. In this type of analysis, binary
executable is converted into human readable assembly format then the analysis is continued
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with this converted format. Specialized software like disassemblers are used for the con-
version process. The downside of this type of analysis is that it needs formidable amount of
expertise to understand the functionality of the binary. Unable to detect data and dataﬂow
is one of the difﬁculties that has been faced during static analysis. Encryption is another
barrier for the static analysis. It is almost impossible to analyze the binary that is encrypted
or packed. The packed or encrypted binary unpacks itself at run time in order to create
meaningful machine code and that is why live code analysis is the only hope for the packed
or encrypted binary.
2.5.2 Live Code Analysis
Like static analysis, live code analysis also works with the idea of converting machine
code into human readable assembly form using either a disassembler or a decompiler. In
addition to that, live code analysis runs the code inside a debugger. Using the debugger,
user can single step through each line of code. As the program runs inside a debugger, the
internal data structure, the control ﬂow and the sequence of function calls can be viewed
and analyzed to get in depth understanding of the binary.
2.5.3 Disassembler
Disassembler is a very important tool for the task of reverse engineering. This software
tool is a must for all types of reverse code analysis. The task of a disassembler is to take
the machine code as input and then to convert it into human readable assembly format.
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Disassembler enumerates each machine instruction and decodes into the assembly repre-
sentation. As the machine instruction sets are different for different hardware platform,
the corresponding assembly representation is also different. This turns the disassembly to
become platform speciﬁc. For instance, IDA Pro [74] and OllyDbg [96] are the two most
commonly used powerful disassemblers with multi platform support.
2.5.4 Decompiler
Decompilers does slight higher attempt compare to the disassemblers. Decompiler takes
the machine instruction as input and rather than converting into assembly code it converts
it into a high-level code. As the name indicate, the intent is to perform the exact opposite
process that compiler does. Though it is quite impossible (up to now) to generate the same
high-level code, it is possible to reproduce code that helps to understand the real code with
some manual modiﬁcations. Recently, Hex-Rays releases Hex-Rays decompiler [74] that
works as a plugin of IDA Pro. Hex-Rays decompiler generates C-like representation of the
machine code.
2.5.5 Debugger
A typical debugger is a computer program that assists to examine or debug other programs
to detect and locate errors. Debuggers in combination with disassemblers form a very
powerful reverse engineering platform to understand the secrets of code where source code
is unavailable. Most debuggers support a functionality to step through the code. Stepping
through the code means the execution of each instructions separately and transfer control
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to the debugger after execution of each instruction. In IA-32 processor family, the single
stepping is implemented using the processor’s Trap Flag (TF) in the EFLAGS register. If the
trap ﬂag is enabled then the processor generates a single step interrupt (Interrupt number
1) after executing each instruction. While stepping through the code, debugger shows a
disassembled view of the binary with the help of a disassembler. At the same time, it
shows the contents of the CPU registers and also the contents of the stack. Some of the
well-known debugging frameworks are: IDA Pro [74], PaiMei [45] and OllyDbg [96].
IDA Pro Disassembler & Debugger
IDA Pro Disassembler & Debugger [74] is an extremely strong disassembler and debugger
from Hex-Rays. IDA Pro can be hosted on Windows, Linux, or Mac OS X. The tool supports
disassembly of more than 50 processor families, including IA-32, IA-64 and AMD 64 [73].
A typical IDA Pro interface is shown in Figure 2.2. IDA Pro is one of the best choice as a
disassembler or debugger for the following reasons:
• Programmability and Extendibility. User can extend the IDA Pro functionality using
the Software Development Kit (SDK) provided by IDA Pro. IDA Pro SDK can be
used to manipulate the process of disassembly. An internal C like language is used
to extend its functionality. Analyzer can write his own script to automate the process
of reverse engineering.
• Code Graphing. IDA Pro is capable to show the assembly code in a graphical view,
which is very useful from the analyzer point of view. Figure 2.3 shows graphical
view of the assembly code.
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Figure 2.2: Typical IDA Pro Screen
• Plugins. A vast collection of IDA Pro plugins are readily available to use that are
developed by IDA Pro community [43]. Among the plugins, some are extremely
helpful for reverse engineering. For instance, IDAPython [68] enables IDA Pro to
write script in Python programming language; Fake Code Remover tries to remove
fake code from executable; FindCrypt2 helps to detect cryptographic algorithms that
are used in target programs; and IDA Stealth [42] and Stealth [4] are useful to surpass
anti-debugging tricks that are generally used in modern malware. Debugging of mal-
ware will turn more hectic without the help of IDAStealth and Stealth. IDAStealth
is capable to hide debugger from most of the anti-debugging traps. A screen shot of
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Figure 2.3: IDA Pro Graphical View
IDAStealth is shown in Figure 2.4.
2.6 Behavioral Analysis
Behavioral analysis is the process of understanding the internal mechanisms of applications
by examining their interactions with the systems they run on. Because of the unavailability
of malware source code and the arduous nature of code analysis, behavioral analysis has
long been used in the area of malware analysis. The broad-spectrum of behavioral analysis
is to execute the malware in a secured instrumented environment and thereby observe how it
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Figure 2.4: IDAStealth Interface
interacts with the ﬁle system, registry, API functions and network. The results of behavioral
analysis can directly be used to detect malicious activities. For example, Symantec [19]
uses behavioral analysis techniques to ﬁnd heuristics of malicious code. In the following
we describe few specialized tools that are used for behavioral analysis.
2.6.1 Registry Monitoring
We can get a fair amount of information by monitoring the registry changes. Malware often
changes the registry to survive reboot and for other purposes. Open source tool Regshot
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Figure 2.5: Regshot Interface
[14] is quite helpful to detect the registry changes. Regshot allows users taking registry
snapshots prior and after executing a malware. The tool comes with a compare feature that
allows ﬁnding the changes done by the executed malware. The user interface of Regshot
is shown in Figure 2.5. Another effective tool for monitoring registry is RegMon which is
integrated with Process Monitor; a tool from Sysinternals Suite by Mark Rusinovich [103].
2.6.2 Process Monitoring
Active system monitoring like process monitoring provides valuable information. The tar-
geted investigable information includes: process name and ID, path of the executable pro-
gram, loaded modules and associated handlers. Windows Sysinternals [103] suite provides
two useful tools for process monitoring, namely Process Explorer and Process Monitor.
Process Explorer is like an extended version of Windows task manager. Using Process
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Figure 2.6: Process Explorer Interface
Explorer, we can see the handles and the Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) opened by a spe-
ciﬁc process as shown in Figure 2.6. In the ﬁgure, we can see that the interface has two
sub windows. The top window shows the list of currently running processes whereas the
bottom window shows the opened handles or the DLLs depending on the conﬁguration of
the tool.
2.6.3 File System Monitoring
Detecting ﬁle system changes is another important aspect of understanding malware ac-
tivities. File system monitoring can provide fair amount of information, though it is hard
39
to detect ﬁle system changes caused by a malware. The reason is that malware often in-
stalls rootkits to manipulate the output of the ﬁle access API. Filemon from Sysinternals
suite [103] is now integrated with Process Monitor which is a very effective tool to monitor
ﬁle-system level trafﬁc between programs and operating systems.
2.6.4 InstallSpy
Monitoring of the installation process often provides baseline information regarding a mal-
ware. InstallSpy [44] is used to track any changes in registry or ﬁle systems when a program
is executed or installed. To capture these changes, InstallSpy ﬁrst takes a snapshot of the
system before executing the target malware. The taken snapshot acts as a base to detect
further changes in the system. After taking the ﬁrst snapshot, InstallSpy prompts to execute
the target malware. After the execution of the malware InstallSpy takes another snapshot,
compares both snapshots for the changes in the system and generates an HTML report.
2.6.5 SysAnalyzer
SysAnalyzer is another runtime malware analysis tool from iDefense Labs to detect various
system changes [81]. Though it is almost impossible to get in-depth knowledge using these
types of tools, a fair amount of knowledge can be obtained that can assist other types of
analysis. SysAnalyzer also comes with ProcessAnalyzer to gather process-related infor-
mation from systems. SysAnalyzer is capable to monitor and compare: running processes,
open ports, loaded drivers, injected libraries, key registry changes, called APIs, ﬁle modi-
ﬁcations and different network trafﬁcs. Moreover, SysAnalyzer is also capable to create a
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memory dump of target process, parse memory dump for strings and scan memory dump
for known exploit signatures.
2.6.6 Network Monitoring
Network activity monitoring is another signiﬁcant part of behavioral malware analysis.
Capturing or revealing network activities can provide numerous insights about the targeted
malware or botnet. It can provide information about the communication protocol that is
used to communicate between a bot and a Command and Control server (HTTP, UDP or
P2P). Network trafﬁc analysis also can be used to detect the C&C server and the opened
ports associated with the bot or malware. A number of readily to use network analyzers
are available to use ranging from simple to robust and multi-functional. Few of them are:
Visual Sniffer [41], Network Probe [95], PacketMon [39], SmartSniff [17], IP Sniffer [38]
and Wireshark [122]. Among them Wireshark, a GUI-based network trafﬁc analyzer, is the
most popular among the users. There is another network monitoring tool namely CurrPorts
[36] which is very useful to detect open ports in systems. For each opened port in the
system, CurrPorts displays information about the process that is responsible to open the
port along with the process name. CurrPorts also provides the full paths of processes as
well as the version information.
2.6.7 Capture BAT
Capture BAT is a behavioral analysis tool for Win32 operating system family [3]. Capture
BAT is developed and maintained by Christian Seifert and is a product of New Zealand
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Honeynet Chapter. Capture BAT is able to detect system changes while an application is
running or a document is being processed. Capture BAT has the capability to detect state
changes on kernel level and it is also capable to ﬁlter out event noise that naturally occurs
on an idle system. Capture is also able to detect changes when executing documents, e.g.,
the behavior of a malicious Microsoft Word document.
2.6.8 Sandboxes
So far, we have described different system monitoring tools to analyze different aspects of
systems. It would be better to implement an environment equipped with all the function-
ality of system monitoring tools. Accordingly the researchers come up with sandbox. A
sandbox is a security mechanism for separating running programs. It is used to execute
malware program in a tightly-controlled environment. In essence, it is an automated tool
to analyze malware in a secured environment. There are few sandbox implementations for
example, Norman Sandbox [94], The Reusable Unknown Malware Analysis Net (TRU-
MAN) [111], GFI Sandbox [70], Anubis [5] and Joebox [104]. The general purpose of all
the sandboxes lies on logging system interactions. One technique used by sandboxes to log
system interactions is by hooking system functions. Function hooking means the intercep-
tion of any call to that function. When a hooked function is called, control is delegated to a
different location where the injected code resides5. The injected code then performs its own
operation. It may prevent execution of the hooked function or may tamper the return result
of the hooked function. Some sandboxes also retrieve system interactions using emulation




The analysis of botnets is a worthwhile exercise. It aims at uncovering the employed tech-
nologies in terms of obfuscation, encryption, injection and communication. Efﬁcient de-
tection, eradication and prevention techniques can be designed and implemented from the
insights gained from such type of analysis. In the sequel, we discuss the state-of-the-art
research proposals in the area of botnet analysis.
Nazario [93] has presented the analysis of an HTTP botnet, namely, BlackEnergy. The
analysis has provided a detailed information about the botnet architecture, commands and
communication patterns. BlackEnergy is a web-based crimeware tool that allows building
bot binaries. The main threat of this botnet is its capability to perform Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack. Chiang and Lloyd [57] have studied the Rustock rootkit. This
rootkit contains a spam bot module. The authors have studied the network traces and
noticed that the trafﬁc is encrypted by RC4 algorithm. The Rustock rootkit has multiple
levels of obfuscation, which makes it hard to detect. The main usage of this tool resides
in spamming. In addition to the network analysis, the authors have been able to extract
the encryption key of the communication. Konstantin Rozinov have described the reverse
engineering ﬁndings of the Bagle virus [102]. He has also described the resources and the
environment used for the reverse engineering process.
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Daswani et al. [63] have put forward a detailed case study of clickbot.A. This bot is re-
sponsible of low-noise click fraud attack against syndicated search engines. Their analysis
has covered the main components of this botnet as well as the commands and the conﬁg-
uration. Porras et al. [98] reverse engineered the Storm botnet. They have detailed the
techniques that have been used to hide the binary and how it has been obfuscated. This
botnet is primarily used to send email spams and DDoS attacks. Thorsten et al. and Brian
Kerbs have investigated the the Storm botnet by studying the encryption key generation
algorithm that is used for communication between different peers [79, 82].
David and Sven have reported their analysis of the Nugache instance [66]. They have
analyzed the communication pattern between different principals. The communication is
based on a key exchange protocol. In Nugache botnets, the bot herder instructs bots to listen
to a speciﬁc IRC channel in order to initiate a DDoS attack. The authors have addressed
extra aspects of their initial analysis and estimated the size of the Nugache botnet using a
bot client crawler. Burji et al. [55] have presented a case study of the Nugache worm using
reverse engineering techniques. The authors have studied the generation of the dynamic
pattern of the malware using rough set based machine learning tool. In their work, they
have used data mining techniques to extract attributes from the reverse engineer of the
malware. The attributes are then used to deﬁne decision rules in a natural language format.
Afterwards, decision rules are used to ﬁnd how the attributes are dependent to ﬁnd the
dynamic patterns.
Danilo et al. [54] have proposed a strategy of detecting self-mutating metamorphic mal-
ware. They have analyzed the type of the transformations that are adopted by the malware
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to mutate itself. They have also proposed a self-mutating code detection technique which is
based on the comparison of control ﬂow graphs. Their approach is based on the detection of
the mutation process and on the analysis of programs in order to detect the malicious code.
They have used code normalization technique to ease the process of code comparison. Bai
et al. [47] have discussed about the techniques to ﬁnd similarities between the known mal-
ware and its variants. They have focused on the sequence of a critical API-calling to ﬁnd
the similarities. The critical API-calling graphs are extracted from the control ﬂow graph
for each malware which are then used as the base information of detecting suspicious be-
haviors. They have argued that, their technique can overcome the limitations present in the
antiviruses for the detection of unknown malware as well as the variants of the malware.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of malware and its counterpart malware
analysis. Actually, we have presented different types of malware primarily focusing on
botnet. In addition, we have also discussed about the sophisticated techniques that are used
by new botnets. Furthermore, we have discussed about various tools and techniques used
for reverse engineering including behavioral analysis and reverse code analysis. Moreover,
we have also presented an overview of current literature on the subjects that are related to




Mariposa is a new type of botnet with built-in spreading mechanism. It was claimed that
13 million machines infected around 190 countries in the world by this botnet once it has
appeared in May 2009 [10]. In addition to the spreading capabilities, Mariposa bot has
changed frequently using polymorphism technique in order to evade antivirus detection.
Due to this evolving capability, 1500 variants of Mariposa have been detected so far [10].
Mariposa is able to download and execute malicious code on the ﬂy, which means the
botmaster can inﬁnitely extends the functionality of the malicious software. Moreover, it
can be associated with other botnets since it has the capability to infect machines with
another malware. Mariposa botnet also uses its own communication protocol which is
based on User Datagram Protocol (UDP) protocol. In this chapter, we provide detailed
analysis of Mariposa botnet. We start with a brief overview of Mariposa botnet followed
by a description of the various components of the botnet. Afterwards, we provide the




Different variants of binaries that constitute Mariposa botnet evolved from the so-called
Butterﬂy bot [31]. The author of Mariposa variants enhances the capabilities of the Butterﬂy
bot to make it more robust, resilient, and stealthy. The botnet architecture consists of
a set of clients, a master module and one or many server modules. The architecture is
connectionless because it is based on the UDP protocol [32]. The server plays a role of a
relay between the master and the clients. The UDP protocol is used due to its covertness.
UDP connections are not generally logged in ﬁrewalls and gateways which are not the case
with Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections. In order to check the presence of
bot clients, the server pings clients periodically in a predeﬁned time gap. Server marks
the bot as time-out if it does not receive any reply from the bot. Further details about the
communication protocol is described in the network analysis section of this chapter. A
brief description of Mariposa’s components and its features are given below:
• Bot client. The bot has innovative capabilities comparing to majority of the bots
that exist in the wild. It has the ability to make direct code injection into remote
processes. The injected code corresponds to the entry point of all activities that are
done by the bot. Mariposa is capable to download any extra modules (e.g. Zeus
botnet) and execute them on the ﬂy. Besides, it is capable of performing UDP and
TCP ﬂooding, and tuning the ﬂood strength by acting on the data and packet size.
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In addition, the bot has mechanisms to spread through the infection of USB keys
or using MSN messenger and also P2P applications. Moreover, the Mariposa bot
contains a module that tracks the visited web sites and a data grabber that catches
all the posted data that is sent from Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox. On the
other hand, the bot is endowed with two downloaders: The ﬁrst one can download
via HTTP, HTTPS and FTP protocols, whereas the second downloads ﬁles via the
ButterFly Network Protocol [32]. Additionally, it has a built-in cookie stuffer for
Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox. Recently the author of Mariposa has added
new features like slowloris1, ﬂooder and a reverse proxy module. The reverse proxy
module can turn all bots into proxy servers.
• Server. The server is a mediator between the master and the bot clients. It allows
controlling the trafﬁc with clients by setting the number of frames per second in order
to diminish the CPU usage and the communication latency ratio. Botmaster can also
set up the maximum upload limit on the server. The master can localize the bots
using GeoIP localization2.
• Master. The master represents the core of all operations. Master module can get
multiple server connections and it has the ability to enable and disable servers and
clients. The master issues commands to bot clients through servers. These commands
are various and can be used to customize the operations that are done by clients.
1Slowloris is a piece of software used for DDoS attack.
2GeoIP is the geographical orientation of the IP addresses
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3.2 Behavioral Analysis
This section describes the results of our behavior analysis conducted on Mariposa botnet.
It consists of two parts: network trafﬁc analysis and host activity analysis. In behavioral
analysis, we execute a Mariposa sample in a controlled environment to get an idea about
its activities. We also create a controlled environment that prevents spreading of the bot
and ensures the containment of the malware. We arm this controlled environment with a
set of tools in order to monitor different botnet activities. We set up a botnet topology
which contains a master, a server and an infected client. The main goal of the behavioral
analysis acts as a complement for the dynamic code analysis. In the sequel, we describe
the controlled environment that we set up in order to perform the behavioral analysis.
3.2.1 Environment setup
The controlled environment is based on VMware Server 2.0.3 [22] running on a Windows
XP system. This software allows running multiple virtual machines in an isolated envi-
ronment and gives a certain ﬂexibility to create different types of network architecture. In
order to perform dynamic analysis, we set up an isolated network which is disconnected
from the Internet and conﬁgured as a host only network.
The network consists of a default virtual network, which behaves as a stub network.
In our analysis, we use four hosts to build a virtual network where hosts are used to run
different components of the botnet. We install a master and a C&C server in two host ma-
chines. Then, another host machine is used to play the role of Mariposa infected machine.
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The master is connected to the C&C server and plays the role of the controller. It con-
trols bot registrations and sends commands to the bots via the server. Since the bot client
running in the infected host needs name resolution to contact predeﬁned C&C servers, we
useC : \windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts ﬁle as a source of domain name resolution.
The fourth host is used as snifﬁng box which runs a live-CD for network analysts [15].
The utility of this live-CD resides in logging all communications promiscuously in order
to correlate events and monitor the network activities of the botnet. It also allows verifying
the presence of backdoors in the malware. In order to detect all the system changes, sys-
tem monitoring tools like Process Viewer [40], InstallSpy [44] and CurrProts [37] are also
installed in the system. The environment structure is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Conﬁned Environment Structure
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3.2.2 Network Analysis
Before going deep into the static/live code analysis, we perform network analysis in order
to understand about the communications between different components of the Mariposa
bot. The communication protocol that is used in Mariposa is also another issue that we
are interested about. To conduct the analysis, we set up the environment according to the
Figure 3.7. The NSMnow [25] network security analyzer is conﬁgured to capture trafﬁc in
promiscous mode.
After analyzing the intercommunication trafﬁc between the master, server and client,
we break them into three phases: initialization phase, bot liveness phase and action phase.
All these three phases involve the participation of the master, server and bot client module.
In the following, we describe different phases of the communication:
• Initialization phase. The initialization phase takes place immediately after an in-
fection. Once a bot takes control of a victim machine, its next target is to register
himself with the C&C server so that it can receive commands from the server. To
register with the C&C server, bot sends a join server command to the server. The
join server message contains an encrypted magic word to authenticate himself to the
server. If server authenticates the
bot, it acknowledges the registration by sending a join acknowledgement packet. By
receiving this packet, the bot sends an acknowledgement and a command/response
packet to the server. This command/response packet contains information about the
compromised machine e.g. system information and country code. Afterwards, the
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Figure 3.8: Mariposa Bot Initialization Protocol
server sends an acknowledgement to the bot and forwards the command/response
to the master, which acknowledges the reception of this message to the server. The
initialization phase is shown in Figure 3.8.
• Bot liveness check phase. After the initialization phase, bot client is successfully
registered to the server. At this point, we can observe the second phase of the com-
munication which checks the liveness of bot clients. In liveness check phase, the
server keeps sending command/response packets to the bot client in a frequency of
predeﬁned tunable time. If a given bot is alive, it replies with an acknowledgement
packet. Otherwise, the bot will be marked as time-out bot. Liveness phase is depicted
in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Mariposa Bot Liveness Protocol
• Action phase. The bot client is now running in the remote machine. Server checks
the liveness of the bot periodically, and the bot is now ready to execute commands
issued by the master. The action phase aims to instruct the bots to make actions at the
infected hosts. In order to initiate the process, the master sends command/response
packet to the server. Master is capable to send the commands to any speciﬁc bot,
or a group of bots using GeoIP localization. The server forwards this packet to the
bot. After receiving the packet, the bot performs the action that is mentioned in the
packet. It acknowledges its action by sending an acknowledgement packet to the
server. The server also acknowledges by sending an acknowledgement packet to the
master. Action phase is shown in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Mariposa Bot Action Protocol
3.2.3 Sandbox Analysis
Prior to reverse code analysis, we analyze the malware using GFI Sandbox [70] to get an
initial insight. As we have discussed before in Chapter 2, GFI Sandbox is an automated
malware analysis tool to monitor and report the behavior of malware at runtime. From
the insight provided by GFI Sandbox, we notice that after the execution, Mariposa creates
some new ﬁles in C : \RECYCLER directory and sets the ﬁle attributes to hidden, read-
only, system and anonymous. These ﬁles could be used to save a local copy of the bot.
Thereafter, Mariposa infects the explorer.exe process. We also ﬁnd that the thread that
runs inside explorer.exe manipulates some ﬁles and registry changes and eventually tries
to communicate with the C&C server. We present three screen shots showing the analysis
report of GFI Sandbox below. Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show the partial result of ﬁle
and registry activities respectively whereas Figure 3.13 shows the network activity of the
Mariposa bot.
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Figure 3.11: Mariposa File System Activity By GFI Sandbox
Figure 3.12: Mariposa Registry Activity By GFI Sandbox
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Figure 3.13: Mariposa Network Activity By GFI Sandbox
3.3 Dynamic Code Analysis
Dynamic code analysis is very imperative in order to get an in-depth understanding of
malware. It actually allows digging into the inner-secrets of the malware code. In our anal-
ysis, we use IDA Pro Disassembler and Debugger [74] to analyze the Mariposa bot client.
The MD5 hash of the malware variant is 3E3F7D8873985DE888CE320092ED99C5. The
analysis consists of debugging the executable and getting over the obfuscation and anti-
debugging techniques that are employed by Mariposa. We also analyze the code injec-
tion process of Mariposa as well as its after-injection activities like registry manipulation,
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spreading mechanism, etc.
After loading the bot binary in IDA Pro, we observe that most of the bot codebase
is meaningless which implies a highly encrypted code. Figure 3.14 depicts the different
phases of Mariposa bot metamorphose. We can see that bot code goes under multiple de-
cryption routines to turn into valid machine instruction. We can also see extensive use of
anti-debugging techniques to make the task of reverse engineering arduous. The execution
of the bot client can be characterized into four phases: the obfuscation phase, the decryp-
tion phase, the injection phase and the after-injection phase. In the sequel, we introduce the
different phases that are related to the de-obfuscation, anti-debugging traps and different
decryption layers.
Figure 3.14: Mariposa Decryption Phases
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3.3.1 De-obfuscation and Decryption
Code obfuscation is nowadays a standard practice within Malware. It constitutes the con-
cealment of the intended meaning of integrated malicious code. It makes the code con-
fusing, intentionally ambiguous and more difﬁcult to interpret. In the Mariposa bot, the
obfuscation starts with useless computations. These computations are conducted within a
loop that iterates 889,976,605 times. Figure 3.15 shows the loop using IDA Pro.
.text:0041D476 loc_41D476:
.text:0041D476 and edi, 59h
.text:0041D479 dec ebp
.text:0041D47A rol edi, 66h
.text:0041D47D cmp ebp, 0
.text:0041D480 jnz short loc_41D476
.text:0041D482 dec ebx
Figure 3.15: Unwanted Loop
At the end of this loop, a jump is performed to an address loaded into EAX register.
As a consequence, control transfers to a routine that XORs the range of data that is located
between the addresses 0x41D000 and 0x41D4C0 with the constant 0x0CA1A51E5. The
outcome of this decryption routine is a valid code block that will be used later for anti-
debugging traps and further code decryption. This is the ﬁrst routine employed by Mariposa
for the code decryption. Figure 3.16 shows the routine in assembly.
At the end of this decryption routine, the address 0x41D047 is pushed onto the stack.
As a result, the control ﬂow is transferred to this address and anti-debugging traps start
executing as we have stated before.
58
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFA6 xor dword ptr [ecx], 0CA1A51E5h
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFAC nop
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFAD add ecx, 4
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFB0 nop
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFB1 nop
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFB2 cmp ecx, offset dword_41D4C0
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFB8 jl short sub_13FFA6
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFBA nop
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFBB push offset loc_41D047
Stack[00000B00]:0013FFC0 retn
Figure 3.16: First Decryption Routine
3.3.2 Anti-debugging traps in Mariposa
Anti-Debugging techniques are ways for a program to detect if it runs within a controlled
environment or a debugger. They are used by commercial binary protectors, packers and
malicious programs to prevent or slow-down the process of reverse engineering. The Mari-
posa bot client uses several anti-debugging techniques. These techniques make the reverse
engineering tasks as strenuous and difﬁcult as possible. These techniques increase the time
that is required for the full analysis of the bot binary.
The valid code located between the addresses 0x41D000 and 0x41D4C0 is the outcome
of the ﬁrst decryption routine. The code resides in this range is responsible for the anti-
debugging traps and second layer decryption. The address 0x41D047 constitutes the entry
point of the code segment that employs anti-debugging traps. The most important anti-
debugging techniques that have been encountered in this code segment are ICE breakpoint,
Outputdebgstring, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetTickCount and Stack Segment Regis-
ter. Mariposa also uses debugger detection codes in various parts of its execution.
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ICE Breakpoint
It is one of the Intel’s undocumented instructions with opcode 0xF1. The execution of
this instruction generates a single step exception. This instruction pushes a debugger to
think that a normal exception is generated by the program. It sets the single step bit in the
ﬂag register. Thus, the associated exception handler is not executed. In order to bypass
this trap, we avoid the use of single step execution of the code segments that contain ICE
breakpoints.
Stack Segment Register
Stack Segment Register trap works by exploiting a property of the Intel x86 hardware de-
bugging system. According to Intel x86 architecture, hardware breakpoints are not effective
when they used after pop ss instruction. If the program traced (using a debugger) over pop
ss instruction, the next instruction will be executed covertly. As a consequence, the trap
ﬂag remains set. Protection code checks the trap ﬂag to detect the presence of a debugger.
Figure 3.17 shows the use of Stack Segment Register trap in Mariposa. It can be observed
that after the pop ss instruction, it uses pushf instruction to push all the ﬂags into the regis-
ter. Afterwards, it calls the routine loc_41D128 to check the ﬂags to determine if the code
is traced or not.
QueryPerformanceCounter
Primarily, theQueryPer f ormanceCounter library function is used to compute the hardware
performance. The function reads the values of performance counters that are stored in some
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.text:0041D113 loc_41D113:
.text:0041D113 cmp eax, 40h
.text:0041D118 push ss
.text:0041D119 pop ss
.text:0041D11A pushf ; Push Flags Register onto the Stack
.text:0041D11B pop eax
.text:0041D11C and eax, 100h
.text:0041D121 add eax, offset loc_41D128
.text:0041D126 push eax
.text:0041D127 retn
Figure 3.17: Stack Segment Register Trap in Mariposa
processor registers 3. Mariposa uses the return value of this function to compare hardware
activity with a threshold value and determines the presence of debugger.
GetTickCount
The GetTickCount library function is located in the library kernel32.dll. It returns the
number of milliseconds that the system has elapsed since it last reboots. The highest return
value is 49.7 days. Mariposa calls theGetTickCount function consecutively in two different
locations of the binary and calculates the difference of the two return values. Afterwards,
it compares the difference with a threshold value to determine the presence of a debugger.
OutputDebugString
The function Out putDebugString, which is generally used by encryption programs, re-
ceives a string as a parameter. If a program runs under a debugger, then, the returned value
of this function corresponds to the address of the string that is passed as a parameter. Oth-
erwise, it returns the value 1. We can see the use of the function Out putDebugString in
3Contemporary processors use registers that act like performance counters. They count performance of
hardware activities within the processor.
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Figure 3.18.
.text:0041D0E0 aOutputdebugstr db ’OutputDebugStringA’,0;
.text:0041D0F3 ;
.text:0041D0F3 push offset aOutputdebugstr
.text:0041D0F8 call eax
.text:0041D0FA add eax, offset byte_41D101
.text:0041D0FF push eax
.text:0041D100 retn
Figure 3.18: OutputDebugString Trap in Mariposa
Various techniques need to be adopted to circumvent the anti-debugging techniques
used in malware. There are some very useful plugins of IDA Pro, which are extremely
helpful to bypass those traps, e.g., IDAStealth [42] and Stealth [4]. To avoid some of the
traps, we need to avoid single stepping on the code segments that constitute the trap.
3.3.3 Second Layer Decryption
After unveiling and sidestepping the obfuscation and the anti-debugging routines, we reach
the part of code that contains the second decryption routine. The second layer of decryp-
tion corresponds to an iteration of a XOR operation with a 32-byte key. Each byte from
the encrypted data is XORed with a byte from the key. This byte corresponds to the
modulo result of data byte position with the size of the key (32 bytes). This algorithm
iterates three times for three different chunks of data. The ﬁrst location of data corre-
sponds to the range [0x401000,0x415FB3]; the second location of data resides in the range
[0x416000,0x417A52] and the third location of data is within the range [0x418000,0x41D21E].
There exist three 32-byte keys; each one is used in the algorithm for each chunk of data.
These keys are located at the following addresses: 0x41D015, 0x41D155 and 0x41D1B4.
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All the three iterations of the decryption use the same algorithm to decrypt the code/data
with different keys. Figure 3.19 shows the assembly code of the second decryption routine.
The pseudocode of the decryption algorithm is also summarized in Figure 3.20. The value
x in the pseudocode corresponds to the key location whereas r1 and r2 are the start and the
end addresses of the data respectively.
.text:0041D128 loc_41D128:
.text:0041D128 mov ebp, 41D015h
.text:0041D12D mov ecx, offset sub_401000
.text:0041D132 mov ebx, 415FB3h
.text:0041D137
.text:0041D137 loc_41D137:
.text:0041D137 cmp ebp, offset loc_41D047
.text:0041D13D jz short loc_41D145
.text:0041D13F mov al, [ebp+0]
.text:0041D142 inc ebp




.text:0041D145 sub ebp, 32h




.text:0041D14C xor [ecx], al
.text:0041D14E inc ecx
.text:0041D14F cmp ecx, ebx
.text:0041D151 jnz short loc_41D137
.text:0041D153 jmp short loc_41D187
Figure 3.19: Second Layer Decryption
After executing the ﬁrst and the second layers of decryption, the control ﬂow reaches a
part that is responsible of loading the imported functions. In this portion, Mariposa loads
functions from module Kernel32.dll. A list of loaded functions are showed in the Ap-
pendix section. Mariposa loads the imported addresses with the help of LoadLibrayA and












Dec_data=Enc_data[i] XOR key[i % 32];
}
}
Figure 3.20: Pseudocode of Second Decryption Routine
is obtained by calling LoadLibraryA which returns a handle of the speciﬁed module. The
next step consists of running third decryption routine. This routine XORs each byte of data





Figure 3.21: GetProcAddress Deﬁnition
After executing the third decryption routine, the program calls few loaded utility func-
tions to get the system and thread information. It calls the GetCurrentProcessID and
GetCurrentThreadID functions to get the process and the thread identiﬁers. The func-
tions QueryPer f ormaceCounter and GetTickCount are used to get the performance of the
processor and the elapsed time of the system since its last reboot respectively. The intent
of collecting this information is to recheck whether the current process runs under a debug-
ger. In order to check whether it runs in a sandbox technology, it veriﬁes the presence of
sbiedll.dll in the system. By getting over these traps, we notice that the program allocates
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60,925 bytes of space in the stack as a preparation to run the fourth decryption routine. The
fourth decryption routine decrypts the data in the range [0x40FE5C,0x41EC59] by running
the code that is shown in Figure 3.22, and loads the result into the allocated space in the
stack. Therefore, Mariposa transfers its control to the stack to execute the lately decrypted
code. The pseudocode for the fourth decryption routine is shown in Figure 3.23.
Until this point, Mariposa code passes several phases of decryption. However, all the
strings are encrypted. These strings represent API functions and a magic word4 that will
be used by the injected process. Once the fourth layer decryption is done, the program runs
a decryption routine three times. This routine decrypts all the strings that are located in
.data section of the binary. Figure 3.24 and Figure 3.25 illustrate the pseudocode and the
assembly routine of the string decryption respectively.
3.3.4 Code Injection
This section describes the process of code injection that is employed by Mariposa. Despite
substantial improvement in host-based security, the code injection technique still sustains
as the favorite method to compromise operating systems. The code injection method is
used to conceal evil processes inside legitimate processes. The execution of a process
inside another address space can be achieved in several ways. We can enumerate Windows
hooks [29], DLL injection and Direct Code Injection (DCI) [11]. The Mariposa bot uses the
DCI technique to inject malicious code inside the address space of explorer.exe. Instead
of writing a separate DLL, the DCI technique directly copies the malicious code inside the
4Magic word is used by Mariposa to authenticate its zombies
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.text:00401000 push ebp
.text:00401001 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401003 push ebx
.text:00401004 push esi
.text:00401005 mov ebx, offset unk_418CA0
.text:0040100A inc ebx
.text:0040100B cmp byte ptr [ebx], 0
.text:0040100E jz short loc_40104D
.text:00401010 call $+5
.text:00401015 pop esi
.text:00401016 add esi, 4Ah
.text:00401019 mov ecx, 0EDFDh
.text:0040101E sub esp, ecx
.text:00401020 sub esp, 3
.text:00401023 mov al, [ebx+1]
.text:00401026 mov ah, [ebx+2]
.text:00401029 not al
.text:0040102B add al, ah
.text:0040102D sar al, 1
.text:0040102F loc_40102F:
.text:0040102F mov bl, ds:(byte_40105F - 40105Fh)[esi+ecx]
.text:00401032 add bl, al
.text:00401034 xor bl, ah
.text:00401036 inc al
.text:00401038 mov [esp+ecx+0EE0Ah+var_EE0B], bl
.text:0040103C loop loc_40102F
.text:0040103E mov edx, 401FE0h
.text:00401043 sub edx, esi
.text:00401045 mov ebx, esp











Key1=((! key1) + key2) / 2;
Source_address= 40FE5C;
Enc_data[0xEDFD] = getData(Source_address, Source_address +0xEDFD );
Dec_data[0xEDFD]=null;
Dest_address = 0xXXXX;//in the stack.
for(i=o; i<Enc_data.length ; i++){
Dec_data[i]= (Enc_data[i] + key1) XOR key2;
If(key1==0xFF){













key=( key2+ ~Key1) >> 1;
for(i=Size; i >= 0; --i){




Figure 3.24: Pseudocode of String Decryption Routine
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Stack[000010A4]:001389B6 loc_1389B6:
Stack[000010A4]:001389B6 cmp [ebp+var_4], 0
Stack[000010A4]:001389BA jl short loc_1389F5
Stack[000010A4]:001389BC movsx eax, [ebp+arg_8]
Stack[000010A4]:001389C0 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
Stack[000010A4]:001389C3 add ecx, [ebp+var_4]
Stack[000010A4]:001389C6 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx]
Stack[000010A4]:001389C9 add edx, eax
Stack[000010A4]:001389CB mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
Stack[000010A4]:001389CE add eax, [ebp+var_4]
Stack[000010A4]:001389D1 mov [eax], dl
Stack[000010A4]:001389D3 movsx ecx, [ebp+arg_C]
Stack[000010A4]:001389D7 mov edx, [ebp+arg_0]
Stack[000010A4]:001389DA add edx, [ebp+var_4]
Stack[000010A4]:001389DD movsx eax, byte ptr [edx]
Stack[000010A4]:001389E0 xor eax, ecx
Stack[000010A4]:001389E2 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
Stack[000010A4]:001389E5 add ecx, [ebp+var_4]
Stack[000010A4]:001389E8 mov [ecx], al
Stack[000010A4]:001389EA mov dl, [ebp+arg_8]
Stack[000010A4]:001389ED add dl, 1
Stack[000010A4]:001389F0 mov [ebp+arg_8], dl
Stack[000010A4]:001389F3 jmp short loc_1389AD
Stack[000010A4]:001389F5 loc_1389F5:
Stack[000010A4]:001389F5 mov esp, ebp
Stack[000010A4]:001389F7 pop ebp
Stack[000010A4]:001389F8 retn 10h
Figure 3.25: String Decryption Routine in Assembly
remote process using theWriteProcessMemory function. Afterwards, the injected thread is
invoked using the createRemoteThread function. The DCI technique can be summarized
as follows:
1) Retrieving the handle of the remote process by calling the OpenProcess function.
2) Allocating memory inside the remote process in order to inject data that is achieved by
calling the VirtualAllocEx function.




4) Executing the injected code using the CreateRemoteThread function.
In order to prepare for code injection, Mariposa creates important data that is used by
the injected code for various purposes. The data breaks into names of directories and names
of ﬁles. The created data is:
• Directory Path: C : \Recycler\s−1−5−21.
• Directory Path: C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−
8454. The directory access control is set to read, write and execution permissions.
• File Name: C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−
8454\
Desktop.ini.
• File Name: C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−
8454\
windll.exe.
Before ﬁring the injection process, the program calls the GetVersion function in order
to retrieve the operating system version. The reason behind this call resides in checking
whether the operating system is Windows NT or not. It makes this checking to ensure if
it can call the CreateRomoteThread function or not 5. At the beginning of the injection
process, the program calls the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function to take a snapshot of
5TheCreateRemoteThread function works only in Windows NT versions.
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the processes that run in the system. Afterward, it enumerates the existing processes by
calling the Process32First and Process32Next functions. Once explorer.exe process is
found in the snapshot, it retrieves its process identiﬁer. The process ranging from taking
a snapshot to look for a speciﬁc process identiﬁer is summarized using the pseudocode





BOOL retval, ProcFound = false;
thSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot( );











Figure 3.26: Process Lookup Pseudocode
After obtaining the process identiﬁer, the program calls the OpenProcess function to
open the explorer.exe process. Afterwards, it calls the VirtualAllocEX function to allo-
cate memory within the targeted process. It uses the NtWriteVirtualMemory function to
write into the explorer.exe process. Once the code is written in the allocated virtual mem-
ory location, the program calls theCreateRemoteThread function to run the injected code.
The CreateRemoteThread function uses seven parameters to create a new thread. Fig-
ure 3.27 illustrates the pseudocode of the injection process whereas the declaration of the




















Figure 3.27: Code Injection Pseudocode
HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(
HANDLE hProcess, // handle to process to create thread in
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, // pointer to attributes
DWORD dwStackSize, // initial thread stack size, in bytes
LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress, // pointer to thread
function
LPVOID lpParameter, // argument for new thread
DWORD dwCreationFlags, // creation flags
LPDWORD lpThreadId // pointer to returned thread identifier
);
Figure 3.28: CreateRemoteThread Function Declaration
3.3.5 Injected Thread Activity
Our next target is to analyze the part of the program that is injected into the address space
of explorer.exe. In order to analyze a live process, we need to attach that process into an in-
stance of the IDA Pro debugger. Attaching and analyzing live explorer.exe is troublesome.
It creates a lot of problems including freezing the system. To overcome this problem, we
patch the portion of the program where it chooses explorer.exe as the process to inject. We
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choose winlogon.exe to replace explorer.exe. By this way, we enforce Mariposa to inject
code into winlogon.exe instead of explorer.exe.
After the injection, we attach the injected process winlogon.exe into the IDA pro de-
bugger. In order to get the control of the debugging process, we set a breakpoint at
the entry point of the newly created thread. The entry point is found by observing the
CreateRemoteThread function. The LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE ﬁeld in the deﬁni-
tion of the CreateRemoteThread function (shown in Figure 3.28) represents the starting
address of the invoked thread.
At the beginning, the injected thread creates amutex object using the name c__kd jcpeoi j.
The mutex object is used to ensure singular execution of the bot. The intent is to avoid a
possible running of multiple bot instances, which can crash the system, or at best slow
down the machine. It uses the WaitForSingleOb ject function with a predeﬁned waiting
time to ensure singular execution. Once the single instance checking is ensured, it creates
two ﬁles:
• C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7344526690−8558129233−739613093−1787\
windll.exe and
• C : \Recycler\S−1−5−21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−8454\
Desktop.ini
At this point, the thread copies the whole bot code to the ﬁleC : \Recycler\S−1−5−
21−7524899924−6962119414−608760223−8454\windll.exe. Afterwards, bot uses the
WsaStartup function to initiate the use of Winsock DLL, which is responsible for socket
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communication. It also opens the registry key so f tware\Microso f t\WindowsNT\
CurrentVersion\Winlogon, and creates a new entry called Taskman. It sets the value of
this entry to C : \Recycler\S− 1− 5− 21− 7524899924− 6962119414− 608760223−
8454\windll.exe. These registry changes are intended to ensure re-infection when the user
reboots the system. It also creates another entry named shell. This entry has the value C :
\Recycler\S−1−5−21−7344526690−8558129233−739613093−1787\windll.exe.
After manipulating registry entries, the bot creates two pipes for inter process commu-
nication. The ﬁrst one is \\.\pipe\cdcpr55 whereas the second one is an anonymous pipe.
The ﬁrst pipe is created in pipe_access_inbound mode, which supports client to server
transfer only. Once the pipes are set, the program calls the InternetOpen function in order
to use WinInet library functions. Mariposa bot uses three hard coded domain names to re-
solve the IP address of the C&C server. It picks the ﬁrst domain name, sends the encrypted
magic word to the resolved IP address and waits for the reply from the server. If the server
does not respond, then, it picks the second or the third domain name and tries to connect to




The sequence of actions of joining the C&C server are:
• The Inet_addr function is used to convert the domain names into proper addresses.
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• The bot retrieves the host information from the corresponding host name by using
the gethostbyname function.
• The htons function is used to convert an unsigned short number from a host to a
TCP/IP network byte order 6.
• The bot encrypts the magic word (bpr1 is the magic word in this variant of Mariposa)
using the pseudocode shown in Figure 3.29.
• The bot sends the encrypted magic word using the sendto function.
• The bot receives a reply from the server by using the recv f rom function.
• The bot decrypts and decodes the received commands and triggers appropriate ac-














Figure 3.29: Magic Word Encryption/Decryption
6Network byte order deﬁnes the bit-order of network addresses as they pass through the network. The
TCP/IP standard Network byte order is big-endian. In order to participate in a TCP/IP network, little-endian
systems usually bear the burden of conversion to Network byte order [80].
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3.4 Modules
Mariposa bot code is designed in modular fashion. Among the modules, spreader module
is used to incorporate virus like spreading activities in the bot code. The uploader/ down-
loader module is used to upload and download information. In the following, we discuss
these modules:
3.4.1 Spreader Module
Mariposa bot comes with a built-in spreader module which turns Mariposa dangerous
in terms of spreading. Spreading module breaks into three different components: USB
spreader, MSN spreader and P2P spreader. In Mariposa botnet, the master can send com-
mands to enable and disable the spreaders. Table 3.2 shows the different commands to
deactivate and activate spreaders.
Command Description
u0 Disable USB spreader
u1 Enable USB spreader
m0 Disable MSN spreader
m1 Enable MSN spreader
p0 Disable P2P spreader
p1 Enable P2P spreader
Table 3.2: Spreading Commands
In the sequel, we introduce the different techniques that are used in spreader modules:
• USB spreader. In order to activate the USB spreader, the program creates a new
top-level window by calling the CreateWindowEx function. The CreateWindowEx
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function returns a handle of the created window. The returned handle is used by the
RegisterDeviceNoti f ication function to register the device for which the speciﬁed
window will receive notiﬁcations. The intent is to receive notiﬁcation from the sys-
tem when a ﬂash drive is inserted. Once a user inserts a USB key, the mentioned
top-level window receives notiﬁcation from the system. Then, the code looks for the
autorun.in f ﬁle in the USB drive. If there is any autorun.in f ﬁle, the process locks
that ﬁle to get the full control. It creates an autorun.in f ﬁle if there is no autorun.in f
ﬁle in the USB drive. Afterwards, Mariposa makes a copy of itself into the drive and
changes the content of the autorun.in f ﬁle so that the copied bot code can run as
AutoRun. Figure 3.30 shows the contents used to tweak the autorun.in f ﬁle.
Figure 3.30: Autorun.inf Content
• MSN spreader. Mariposa bot infects MSN messenger by hooking its sending and
receiving functions. The MSN spreader is activated if the bot receives an enabling
command from the botmaster. This command contains a custom link, which is used
to download the bot. Figure 3.31 shows how the hooking of send and recv functions
is done.
After receiving the activaton command, the bot looks for the msnmsgr.exe process
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Figure 3.31: Hooking in Mariposa
in the system. This operation is done periodically if the speciﬁed process does not
run in the system. Once the msnmsgr.exe process is found, Mariposa bot retrieves its
process Identiﬁer. Then, it calls the OpenProcess function to get the handle of this
process. Afterwards, it creates a duplicate handle of the current process by calling
the GetCurrentProcess and DuplicateHandle functions. At this point of execution,
Mariposa bot starts a new routine which is responsible for injecting code inside the
virtual address space of the msnmsgr.exe process. This routine is called twice. In the
ﬁrst call, it allocates 256 bytes of space by calling the VirtualAllocEX function and
injects code by calling the NtWriteVirtualMemory function. In the second call, it
injects string utility functions and the custom link that is sent by the master. It starts
the new thread by calling the CreateRemoteThread function.
After the injection process, the bot hooks the ws2_32_send function in order to make
the injected code executed for each message that is sent. This is done by calling the
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VirtualProtectEx function to allow writing in the virtual memory. At the end, it calls
the NtWritevirtualMemory function to overwrite with the address of the injected
code.
• P2P spreader. P2P spreader tries to spread the malware using a simple tricks. The
idea is to ﬁnd the shared folder of installed P2P applications by checking the registry
keys, and thereby copy the malware into those shared folders using eye catching
names. It uses names that imitate the crack ﬁle of games, e.g. "Crack Empire Earth".
Mariposa receives these names from the master along with the activation command.
When the bot receives a command that enables the P2P spreader, the program calls
the GetEnvironmentVariable function to get the registry entry for the current user.
The intent behind doing so resides in checking if P2P applications are installed or
not. Mariposa bot looks for the following P2P applications in the system: Ares,
BearShare, iMesh, Shareaza, Kazaa, DC++, eMule and LimeWire. Once it detects
the presence of a P2P application, it copies itself into the shared folder with a fake
name that is issued from the master. Figure 3.32 shows the P2P registry keys that are
accessed by Mariposa bot.
Figure 3.32: P2P Registry Keys
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3.4.2 Uploader and Downloader Modules
During the analysis of the main tread activity, we notice that when the bot receives update/-
download commands, it triggers two new threads. To debug these threads in IDA Pro, we
set a breakpoint at the beginning of each thread. When Mariposa bot transfers the control
to one of these threads, we suspend the original one in IDA Pro and continued debugging
with the new one.
Thread 1: Mariposa starts this thread when the bot receives download commands. By
getting this command, the bot checks the command string. If the latter corresponds to
descargar7, the thread launches the following activities:
• It gets a temporary location in the system to download a new executable within.
• It calls the InternetOpenurl function. The bot feeds this function with a URL and
the command to get a connection with this URL.
• If the InternetOpenurl function succeeds, the bot creates a ﬁle in the temporary
location by using the create f ile function.
• It downloads the ﬁle by using the InternetRead f ile function.
• It writes the ﬁle into the disk by calling the write f ile function.
• It calls the create f ile function again to create the ﬁle.
7Descargar is a Spanish word, which means download
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After downloading the ﬁle, the bot checks the ﬁrst two bytes to check whether the
downloaded ﬁle is an executable or not. If so, it runs it by calling the CreateProcess
function and exits the thread by calling the ExitThread function.
Thread 2: This thread starts when the bot receives upload commands. By getting this
command, the bot checks the string command and compares it with subir8. If the compari-
son is successful, the thread executes the following activities:
• It calls the InternetCrackUrl function to read different URL components.
• It calls the InterConnect function to set a connection with a speciﬁc URL.
• It calls the Htt pOpenRequest function to create an HTTP request.
• It calls the InternetReadFile function to read data to be sent.
• It sends the data by using the Htt pSendRequest function.
• Finally, it closes the connection handle by using the InternetCloseHandle function.
After uploading the ﬁle, the thread calls the ExitThread function to close the thread.
3.5 Functional diagram
By conducting a thorough reverse-engineering task, we notice that Mariposa bot has com-
plex interactions between its functional components. Figure 3.33 summarizes and illus-
trates the different interactions between the different functional components.
8Subir is a Spanish word, which means upload
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Figure 3.33: Mariposa Functional Diagram
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the detailed reverse engineering ﬁndings of Mariposa
botnet. We have discussed a general overview of the botnet along with its network in-
teractions. We have also provided the reverse code analysis of Mariposa detailing its de-
obfuscations, decryption layers, code injection and after-injection activities. In addition,
we have also discussed different modules of Mariposa botnet, e.g., spreader module and
downloader module. The reverse engineering ﬁndings of new botnet like Mariposa may





In this chapter, we describe the detailed analysis of the Zeus botnet. We start with a brief
overview of the botnet followed by details about the components and the network activities
of the botnet. Afterwards, we provide the reverse engineering ﬁndings of the botnet. Fi-
nally, we go through the scripts that we use to extract valuable information from the Zeus
bot binary.
4.1 Overview
Zeus crimeware toolkit is one of the recent and puissant crimeware toolkits that emerged
in the Internet underground community to control botnets. The botnet has been in the wild
since 2007, and in July 2009, Damballa [9] reported Zeus as the number one threat with the
command of 3.6 million infected computers in the United States. It was also estimated that
Zeus is responsible for the 44% of banking malware infections [1]. Symantec Corporation
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referred Zeus as the "King of the Underground Crimeware Toolkits" [59] and in 2009, it
detected 70,330 unique variants of the Zeus binaries. Zeus bot has an amazing quality of
stealing personal information entered in the banking sites. This information stealing capa-
bility along with other features turn Zeus into one of the very effective botnets. Zeus botnet
is controlled by Command & Control (C&C) servers and the communication between the
C&C servers and the bots is based on Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The author of
the Zeus botnet uses various types of covertness techniques to make the botnet undetected.
For example, it uses encrypted trafﬁc to avoid any interception of data. Zeus executable
binary does not use any driver for its operation; its functionality is based on WinAPI in-
terception in user mode, which makes it work even in low privilege user modes. Zeus is
preloaded with many spying capabilities like key-logging, intercepting FTP, POP3 login
passwords, taking screenshots in real time and many more. To steal user credentials, Zeus
uses HTML-injection technique. The bot runs in the infected computer and injects extra
HTML code into the selected web pages which requests additional personal information
that is not required for the original web sites. This lurks the user to input extra information
to the web site which is captured by the bot and transferred to the C&C server. Unlike
Mariposa, Zeus is not equipped with any spreading modules. Then, it is the bot herder’s
discretion about how to conduct the malware for spreading.
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4.2 Zeus components
Zeus botnet toolkit is available to buy in the underground black community and is priced
at US $700 to $5000. The botnet is designed in modular fashion and the modules can be
purchased separately to enrich its functionality. Over the years, numerous versions of Zeus
have been released. Some of the versions are released with minor changes and some of
them are released with major changes comprising added functionality. In this section, we
discuss the Zeus package based on the version v.1.2.4.2. This is the most stable version
of Zeus when we started our analysis on Zeus. The toolkit is comprised of three main
components:
• C& C Server
• Bot builder program and
• Bot.exe
The components interconnection to create the bot and other conﬁguration ﬁles is shown in
Figure 4.34. In the following, we detail these components.
4.2.1 C&C Server
C&C Server is the pivotal part of the crimeware toolkit. This part of the botnet is respon-
sible for issuing commands to the bots located worldwide in a distributed fashion, and it
is also used to receive information from the bots. The information is received from the in-
fected machines in a regular time interval. Zeus C&C server is written in PHP scripts and
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Figure 4.34: Zeus Crimeware Components
it is comprised of two main parts: cp.php and gate.php. The cp.php script is used by the
botmaster for controlling purposes whereas the gate.php script is used as the gateway for
the bots. Control panel (cp.php) uses MySQL database [12] to store information received
from the bots. Besides the traditional functionalities, control panel also provides some extra
functionalities like providing information on the connection speed of bots behind Network
Address Translation (NAT), viewing screenshots of the compromised machines, timing to
ﬁnd the bot online and many others.
4.2.2 Bot Builder
Builder program is responsible to build the bot executable as well as the dynamic conﬁg-
uration ﬁle known as conﬁg.bin. The conﬁg.bin ﬁle is used to update the conﬁguration
of the Zeus bot client dynamically. Builder is also equipped with functionalities to disin-
fect or clean Zeus infected machines. The builder module comes with graphical interface,
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which makes it easier even for the script kiddies to operate Zeus botnet. One of the strong
features of Zeus is the ability to change the conﬁguration ﬁles dynamically by the master.
After taking control of the victim’s machine, bot periodically checks for any update of the
conﬁguration ﬁle (conﬁg.bin). If there is any update, it downloads the new conﬁguration
ﬁle and conﬁgures itself accordingly. Zeus builder uses two conﬁguration ﬁles: conﬁg.txt
and webinject.txt. In the following, we present a brief description about the aforementioned
ﬁles.
Conﬁg.txt
The conﬁguration ﬁle conﬁg.txt incorporates two types of information: static information
and dynamic information. The static part of the conﬁguration ﬁle conﬁg.txt is used by the
builder program while creating bot.exe to embed static information into it. On the other
hand, the dynamic information is used to create the encrypted dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle
called conﬁg.bin. Figure 4.35 shows a sample of the conﬁg.txt ﬁle. Brief descriptions of
the ﬁelds are given here:
• botnet: the botnet name.
• timer_conﬁg: time gap to check the updated version of the conﬁg.bin ﬁle.
• timer_logs: time interval to send logs to the C&C server.
• timer_stats: time gap to send status information to the server.
• url_conﬁg: URL to download the conﬁguration ﬁle.
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;"http://www.google.com" "http://www.yahoo.com" "GP" "" ""
end
entry "TANGrabber"
"https://banking.*.de/cgi/ueberweisung.cgi/*" "S3R1" "*&tid=*" "*&
betrag=*"









Figure 4.35: Conﬁguration File Contents
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• url_compip: server address for reporting the IP addresses.
• encryption_key: RC4 [100] encryption key to encrypt/decrypt the conﬁguration ﬁle.
• url_loader: URL for downloading latest version of Zeus.exe.
• url_server: the location of C&C server.
• ﬁle_webinjects: the ﬁle that contains html injection rules.
• AdvancedConﬁgs: the alternate location to download the conﬁguration ﬁle.
• WebFilters: the list of URLs that should be monitored by the bot. Any data sent to
these URLs is intercepted prior passing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and sent to the
C&C server.
• WebDataFilters: this ﬁeld is like WebFilters. Here string patterns are also provided
along with the URL. Data that is sent to the speciﬁed URL and matched the string
patterns are captured. As usual data is captured before the SSL layer.
• WebFakes: fake URL to redirect the user.
• TANGrabber: patterns used to search for the transaction number in the data that is
posted for the online transaction.
• DnsMap: entries used to change the SystemRoot\system32\drivers\etc\host ﬁle.
This feature can be used to redirect users to the fake sites or to restrict the users to
access certain security sites.
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Webinject.txt
The information of webinject.txt along with the dynamic part of the conﬁg.txt is used by
the builder program to create the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle conﬁg.bin. As we have stated
previously, Zeus uses HTML injection technique to steal personal credential. The idea is to
inject additional HTML code into the legitimate page that bounds the user to provide some
extra information. The targeted sites for the HTML injection and the corresponding HTML
code to inject are provided in the webinject.txt conﬁguration ﬁle. A sample webinject.txt is
shown in Figure 4.36.
Dynamic Conﬁguration File
This part of the builder program is responsible for creating the encrypted conﬁg.bin ﬁle. It
encodes the conﬁguration information from conﬁg.txt and webinject.txt into a special struc-
ture. Afterwards, it encrypts the whole structure using RC4 [100] encryption algorithm that
uses the encryption key from the StaticConﬁg part of the conﬁg.txt ﬁle. This functionality
comes with a graphical user interface and users can also edit conﬁg ﬁles using the builder
tool. Figure 4.37 shows the user interface of the program.
Bot Executable
The pivotal reason of the builder program is to create the bot executable. It constructs the
malware binary in Portable Executable (PE) format. Builder program takes information
from the static part of the conﬁg.txt ﬁle and embeds it into the executable. Some of the










































Figure 4.37: Zeus Builder Interface
from, the encryption key and the timer valuewhich is the time gap to send status information
to the server.
Disinfection Functionality
The builder has a capability to detect the presence of the Zeus bot in the system and also to
remove it. This is to facilitate the botmaster to disinfect the machine if it becomes infected
accidentally while testing the bot. The cleaning routine checks the existence of registry
keys that are created by the bot executable while infecting the machine. Also the routine
looks for some speciﬁc ﬁles in the system. If the registry entries and ﬁles are detected,
builder program cleans some of them and instructs the bot to shutdown itself. Also, it
deletes the stored Zeus binary ﬁle from the system. Figure 4.38 shows the user interface of
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the cleaning module.
Figure 4.38: Zeus Builder Interface (Cleaner)
4.3 Network Analysis
In this section, we describe the network communication between the Zeus client and the
C&C server. Before digging deep into the bot using reverse code analysis, we analyze
the trafﬁc to get a precognition of its activities. This type of analysis is helpful to write
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) rules. To capture the bot trafﬁc, we create a stub network
that is similar to the one used for the analysis of Mariposa bot. We conﬁgure a web server,
which acts as the C&C server and the drop location. This server hosts all resources that are
required to operate the botnet (conﬁg.bin ﬁle, PHP scripts and MySQL database). For the
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customization of the malware, we use the builder program to generate the malware binary
ﬁle, which is conﬁgured to communicate with the C&C server. Within our environment,
fake web sites are generated to reﬂect real scenarios of botnet attacks. All the necessary
entries of the conﬁguration ﬁle as well as the web injects scripts are modiﬁed to target the
fake web site. After infecting a machine with the bot binary ﬁle, we collect network traces
for one day. During this session, the user of the infected machine visits the targeted web
site and then uses login credentials, personal information, and credit card information for
testing purposes.
By analyzing the bot network communications, we can learn the overall behavior of the
Zeus botnet. The network behavior of the Zeus botnet constitutes a starting point, where
we can dig into the crimeware toolkit functionality. Since the Zeus botnet is based on the
HTTP protocol, it uses a pull method to synchronize the botnet communications. From
the collected network traces between the bot and the C&C server, we observe that the bot
periodically checks a speciﬁc server for an up-to-date conﬁguration and bot binary ﬁles.
Moreover, the HTTP communication messages between the two entities are encrypted. We
have to extract the key using the procedure described in Section 4.5 to decrypt the encrypted
packets. After decrypting the network trafﬁc, we manage to determine the communication
pattern between the C&C server and the infected machine. The communication pattern can
be summarized as follows:
• After taking control of the victim machine, the ﬁrst target of the bot is to fetch the
dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle. To do so, the bot sends a request massage Get/conﬁg.bin
to the C&C server.
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• The C&C server replies with the encrypted conﬁg.bin ﬁle. The bot client receives
the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle and decrypts it using the encryption key which is
embedded in the bot binary.
• In some cases, the botmaster wants to involve the infected machine to manage the
botnet. To complete this task, the infected machine has to provide its external IP
address and reports any use of Network Address Translation (NAT). In order to know
the external IP address that is seen by the botnet servers, the infected machine makes
a request to a speciﬁc server. Afterward, this server informs the infected machine
about its external IP address. The server’s URL is provided in the static conﬁguration
ﬁle.
• The bot post the stolen information and its update status report to the C&C server.
The communication pattern between the bot client and the C&C server is illustrated
in Figure 4.39. Timing information is determined using the static conﬁguration structure
described in Section 4.5.
4.4 Reverse Engineering of Zeus
To understand the structure of the bot and the techniques that are used by the black hat
guys, we decide to reverse engineer the Zeus botnet. We use the combination of static
and dynamic analysis to analyze the bot. After loading the bot.exe in IDA Pro, which
is generated by the builder program, we can see that except the initial entry point (EP),
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GET / config.bin 
<encrypted> config.bin 
Zeus Bot Client Zeus C&C Infrastructure 





POST / gate.php 
Figure 4.39: Zeus Communication Pattern
the whole bot code is encrypted. We use manual load option of IDA Pro so that we can
detect all the sections of the executable. It is observed that bot executable contains four
segments: text/code, imports, resources and data. The memory layout of the bot executable
is depicted in Figure 4.40. For the bot.exe, our utmost interest is to ﬁnd out various de-
obfuscation techniques and to locate the key that is used for the RC4 encryption. On the


















Figure 4.40: Segments of Zeus Executable
4.4.1 Revealing De-obfuscation
As like most modern malware, Zeus binary is encrypted and highly obfuscated. The whole
bot code is encrypted except the entry point and the initial de-obfuscation routine. This
initial de-obfuscation routine runs to create further meaningful executable code. In Zeus,
the initial de-obfuscation routine is located just below the entry point. The routine starts
with a long meaningless loop. Malware writer often uses this type of long meaningless loop
to confuse the debugger. After executing this meaningless loop, the routine starts executing
the real decryption routine. The decryption routine uses a 4-byte long key along with a 1-













Figure 4.41: De-ofuscated Code in The Virutal Memory
• Allocates virtual memory for the decrypted data,
• Reads the ﬁrst encrypted byte from memory and adds to it the lower byte from the
4-byte key as well as a seed value and stores it in the virtual memory,
• Increments the pointer to the encrypted memory as well as rotates the key by 1 byte,
and
• Continues until all the data has been decrypted.
The result of the ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine revealed some new code segments. These
segments contain three de-obfuscation routines as shown in Figure 4.41. During our analy-
sis, the initial offset address of the memory for the code segments was 0x390000. After the
address space of the second de-obfuscation routine, there is an 8-byte key that the IDA Pro
incorrectly identiﬁed as code instructions. Figure 4.42 illustrates the location of the 8-byte
key. In the following, we explain the main logic of the second de-obfuscation routine.
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• First, it copies two binary blocks from the text/code segment, concatenates them
together, and then writes them into the virtual memory. The ﬁrst text block contains
data with many zero value bytes that will be ﬁlled by the next text block as shown in
Figure 4.43.
• The routine scans every byte on the ﬁrst text block and when it encounters a hole
(zero byte), it will overwrite the zero byte with the next available byte in the ﬁller text
block. This is repeated until all holes are ﬁlled. The procedure is shown graphically
in Figure 4.44.
Figure 4.42: The 8-byte Key
The block of ﬁlled binary that is the result of the second de-obfuscation routine is still
encrypted. Zeus uses its third de-obfuscation layer to decrypt these data with the 8-byte key
shown in Figure 4.42. The third de-obfuscation layer takes the ﬁrst encrypted byte from the
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Figure 4.43: The Virtual Memory Used By The Second De-obfuscation Routine
beginning of the ﬁlled binary block and XORs it with the lower byte from the 8-byte key.
After that, the algorithm takes the next encrypted byte and also chooses the next byte of the
key to XOR it. It continues the same process until ﬁnishes decrypting the whole block of
the ﬁlled data.
After the third de-obfuscation layer, Zeus continues with the fourth de-obfuscation
layer. The fourth de-obfuscation layer employs heavy computation. Because of its com-
plexity, we do not try to understand its functionality. Instead, we write Python scripts to
imitate the whole process and to get the outcome of the routine. We discuss these scripts
later in Section 4.5.1. After the fourth de-obfuscation routine, we can observe the real entry
point of the malware. The text/code segment is now valid machine instructions. However,
the strings and URLs are still encrypted. Zeus employs another two de-obfuscation layers
to decrypt these strings and URLs. The ﬁrst layer is performed on a set of strings that the
malware uses to load the DLL libraries, retrieve function names, and for other purposes
during the installation process. Similarly, the second layer is used to decrypt URLs that are









00 42 E1 C1
50 00 B3 C1
12 2D 00 BD
00 F2 6C BB
7E 62 82 A4
7E 42 E1 C1 
50 62 B3 C1 
12 2D 82 BD 
A4 F2 6C BB 
Text with missing data
Filler text
Filled text
Figure 4.44: Second De-obfuscation Result




String dec_string = new String(enc_string.length);
for(i = 0 to enc_string.length )
{
dec_string[i] = ( enc_string[i]+ seed ) % 256;




Figure 4.45: Zeus String Decryption Pseudocode
4.4.2 Code Injection and Installation
At this point of execution, the code is decrypted as valid instructions and ready to install the




String dec_URL = new String(enc_URL.length);
for(i = 0 to enc_URL.length )
{
if ( i%2 == 0 )
dec_URL[i] = ( enc_URL[i] + 0xF6 - i*2 ) % 256;
else




Figure 4.46: Zeus URL Decryption Pseudocode
winlogon.exe. Afterwards, it initiates mass process infection from inside the process winlo-
gon.exe. At the beginning of the installation process, Zeus dynamically loads the methods
LoadLibrary and GetProcessAddress from the library Kernel32.dll. Then, Zeus decrypts
the encrypted strings which are used as imported function names using the pseudocode
shown in Figure 4.45. Zeus loads imported function using the methods LoadLibrary and
GetProcessAddress. At this point, Zeus looks for the presence of installed personal ﬁre-
walls from Outpost [13] and ZoneLabs [23]. To do this, Zeus enumerates the process
address space and looks for outpost.exe and zlclient.exe. If any of this precesses are found,
Zeus terminates the installation process. Next, Zeus performs registry changes to survive
reboot. It creates a new registry key namely, Userinit under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/
SOFTWARE/Microsoft/WindowsNT/CurrentVers ion/Winlogon/Userinit, and sets the value
of the key to C : /Windows/System32/sdra64.exe. The later is the location of the ﬁle
where Zeus will be copied. Finally, Zeus injects its entire binary from the memory ad-
dress 0x400000 to 0x417000 into the virtual memory of the winlogon.exe process. Then, it
transfers its control to the newly created thread.
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4.4.3 After-Injection Activity
After-injection activities have two dimensions depending on whether it is a new infection or
rebooting of already infected machine. New infection process performs few extra steps; it
creates a local copy of the malware and saves it in the infected system for further activities.
Activities of creating local copies are listed below:
• Zeus searches for any existing copy of sdra64.exe, which is a copy of the bot itself.
If it is found, Zeus deletes the ﬁle from the infected machine. This happens when the
botmaster updates the bot binary with a new version of the bot.
• It makes a copy of itself and saves it to C : \Windows\System32\sdra64.exe. To
bafﬂe signature based detection, Zeus adds random number of bytes at the end of the
ﬁle.
• In order to conceal himself, it copies the Modiﬁcation, Access, and Creation (MAC)
times information from ntdll.dll and applies them for the copied ﬁle sdra64.exe. The
intention is to bafﬂe users to think that sdra64.exe is a system ﬁle.
• It sets the ﬁle attributes of sdra64.exe as hidden and system. This is another attempt
to hide the created ﬁle.
The malware is now running as a thread in the virtual address space of winlogon.exe.
In this stage, Zeus decrypts strings and URLs by applying the pseudocode described in
Figure 4.45 and Figure 4.46 respectively. Afterwards, Zeus instance that is running inside
winlogon.exe starts injecting into another process, namely svchost.exe. This newly injected
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process initiates a network connection to communicate with the C&C server. After com-
municating with the C&C server, it looks for the update of the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle
and also for the update of the bot itself. During the malware update process, the following
ﬁle system changes can be observed:
A) A new folder is created at the path C : \Windows\System32\lowsec.
B) Two new ﬁles local.ds and user.ds are created and placed into the created directory. The
ﬁle local.ds is used to store the stolen information from the victim machines whereas
the ﬁle user.ds is used to store the downloaded dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle conﬁg.bin.
The thread runs in winlogon.exe acts as the administrative authority of the Zeus malware
activities. It communicates with all other infected processes through a named pipe called
_AVIRA_2109 and this is a sign of another intelligent design. Bot executes actions in a
distributed fashion by performing its activities in different injected processes. This makes
Zeus extremely hard to detect and analyze.
4.5 Key Extraction
The conﬁguration ﬁle conﬁg.txt contains a static part as we have described in Section 4.2.
At the time of building the bot, this part is stored inside the bot binary in a speciﬁc structure.
All static information are inscribed in this structure. The static conﬁguration structure
is shown in Figure 4.47. All the information in this structure is plain except two URLs:
url_compip and url_con f ig. The URL url_con f ig is the location that speciﬁes from where
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to download the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle and the URL url_compip is the web location
that is used to determine the IP address of the infected host. Zeus uses the algorithm
described in Figure 4.45 to decrypt these two URLs. The other information inscribed in the
structure includes a table for the RC4 substitution that is generated from the encryption key
using the RC4 key-scheduling algorithm [100]. This substitution table is used to encrypt
the C&C trafﬁc using the RC4 algorithm.
Figure 4.47: Static Conﬁguration Structure in Zeus Binary
4.5.1 Automated Key Extraction
We notice that the static conﬁguration can provide valuable information to gain control in
some extent over the botnet. As the trafﬁc is encrypted using the RC4 algorithm, we can
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decrypt the trafﬁc using the inscribed key. The information also can be used to decrypt
the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle. To recover the static conﬁguration structure, we have to
proceed with the reverse engineering described in Section 4.4. This requires executing the
malware until it reaches the speciﬁc point. To automate the key extraction process, we
write scripts using Python scripting language. As we have stated before, Python scripts
can be used in IDA Pro with the help of IDAPython plugin to extract information from the
binary executable. The script emulates all the de-obfuscations that are employed in Zeus
and returns the conﬁguration structure. It also equips with the functionality to decrypt
url_compip and url_con f ig. Our experimental result says that our scripts are capable to
extract conﬁguration structure from any subversion of Zeus v.1.2.x.x because all of these
subversions hold the same logical structure.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the reverse engineering ﬁndings of Zeus crimeware
toolkit. Actually, we have presented the different components and their interconnections to
build up the botnet. We have also presented the network interactions of the botnet. Further-
more, we have discussed all the decryption routines to reach the bot installation process.
Additionally, we have developed Python scripts to extract the static conﬁguration structure




The task of reverse engineering to understand and analyze low level system contains chal-
lenges. When we relate the topic with malware, it becomes more rigid because of the
inherent nature of complexities involved with malware. The current lack of visualizations
in assembly language tools further deteriorates the situation. To comprehend complex mal-
ware binaries, it is useful to get help from tools to support the analysis. Visualization is very
important to analyze this type of binaries. In order to ﬁnd out what are the most important
problems for malware analysis and the corresponding opportunities for visualization, we
conduct an initial survey [48]. Our survey reveals that control ﬂow is particularly crucial for
program comprehension in malware domain. Most of the user interfaces used to visualize
the low level systems are dated and used to navigate and explore large code bases. The
engineers of higher level systems often rely on tools for effectively navigating codebases
and analyzing the design. On the other side, the corresponding facility for the low level
system is severely lacking.
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As an example, we can consider a call graph generated by IDA Pro Disassembler and
Debugger, which is a state-of-the-art tool in the ﬁeld of reverse engineering. Figure 5.48
shows a function call graph of Mariposa bot generated by IDA Pro. We also zoom a speciﬁc
portion of the graph in Figure 5.49. There are many noticeable issues in the graph. The
ﬁrst thing is that the graph is static and there is no execution trace in it. Also, it does not
show external calls. Another important thing to mention is that there is no way to locate
a speciﬁc function in the graph and thereby, the user needs to locate it manually. Even in
one stage, if the user becomes familiar with the environment, the next faced problem is
that there is no way to follow a single call. Moreover, the graph does not show the correct
ordering of calls nor it does indicate if the function call occurs more than once.
Considering the lack of user interface tools for the analysis of low-level systems, we
propose a new user interface designed to reduce the cognitive overhead of analyzing low-
level systems especially in malware domain. We name our tool Tracks. The tool is inte-
grated with IDA Pro and it allows the user to effectively visualize and trace the function
call sequences when analyzing the binary using IDA Pro. In this chapter, we describe the
architecture, functionality and different features of the tool. Moreover, we present a case
study to demonstrate the features where we analyze Mariposa bot client using our proposed
tool.
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Figure 5.48: Function Call Graph in IDA Pro
Figure 5.49: Zoomed Function Call Graph in IDA Pro
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5.1 Low-level Program Comprehension
To ﬁnd out the most difﬁcult aspects of low-level program comprehension, we conduct a
survey on 15 practitioners in the corresponding domain. The details of the survey can be
obtained in [48]. In the questionnaire of the survey, we ask questions about the current tools
specially regarding browsing/navigation, debugging and control ﬂow requirements. Our
intention is to ﬁnd out the relatively difﬁcult tasks in low-level program comprehension.
According to the survey, the top reported most difﬁcult tasks are following data and control
ﬂow. The most time consuming tasks are trying to locate a certain behavior within the
code, control ﬂow analysis, dataﬂow analysis, de-obfuscations and decryptions. Among
them, control ﬂow analysis is graded as the most difﬁcult and time consuming. We also
ask developers about the usefulness of reverse control ﬂow. Reverse control ﬂow is to step
backward in a given function to discover what path leads there. The developers are also
asked about what information they might like to extract from the control ﬂow data. Table
5.3 summarizes the result of the control ﬂow requirements from the survey.
Asked Reported
Static concerns 20% (3/15) Loop and recursion
Dynamic concerns 7% (1/15) Multi-threaded traces
7% (1/15) Trace comparing
7% (1/15) Branch frequency
Reversed ﬂow useful 87% (13/15) Yes
Information to mine 47% (7/15) System call patterns
13% (2/15) Compare traces
12% (2/15) Reaching execution points and jump conditions
Table 5.3: User Requirements for Control Flow
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5.2 Tracks: The Sequence Viewer
In this section, we describe the sequence viewer tool that we call Tracks. First, we elab-
orate the different control ﬂow views supported by Tracks. When we talk about control
ﬂow from the perspective of the computer science and specially for the purpose of reverse
engineering, it means the ﬂow or the order of function calls. Order of function calls or the
control ﬂow is imperative to understand the functionality of malware. There are several
types of control ﬂow views to deal with. The ﬁrst is a static control ﬂow which shows all
the function calls from the current function. The second is a history view and ﬁnally, the
dynamic control ﬂow view. Our tool Tracks supports the three types of the control ﬂow
views. In the sequel, we provide a detailed explanation of each views and we also explain
the visual features of the tool. Furthermore, we provide details of how Tracks is integrated
with IDA Pro to display the control ﬂow views.
5.2.1 Static Control Flow
In order to visualize static control ﬂow, we need all function call data from the IDA Pro.
This function call data are received from IDA Pro using a IDA Pro plugin that we built.
The IDA Pro plugin iterates through the binary executable inspecting each address for the
cross references and external calls. Tracks interprets the data provided by the plugin and
organizes them in a tree view. Figure 5.50 shows the static call graph function of calc.exe.
When the user selects a function on the tree, the corresponding static call graph is displayed
in the right top pane as shown in Figure 5.50. The user can extend the function calls to
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Figure 5.50: Tracks Static Call Graph
visualize the sub function calls. We also provide graphical signs to differentiate imported
function calls from local calls. User can differentiate the imported functions1 by observing
an I icon next to the function name.
5.2.2 Dynamic Control Flow
Static control ﬂow view renders the control ﬂow diagram when the executable is not run-
ning. This scenario is not suitable for all the cases especially for malware analysis. Most
1Imported function means that the function is located in another ﬁle.
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of the malware are packed and deployed with multiple layers of encryption. In such cases,
it may happen that initially there is no deﬁned functions in the binary. An initial chunk
of codes may load instructions into the stack, which thereby decrypts some part of the en-
crypted malware code into meaningful machine codes. To counter these types of problems,
dynamic control ﬂow view renders the control ﬂow diagram in runtime by collaborating
with IDA Pro. Tracks receives a message whenever a new function is executed during a
debugging session in IDA Pro. User can open the Dynamic control ﬂow diagram either by
selecting a function in the tree view or through the menu options. If the diagram is opened
from the tree view, a breakpoint will be set automatically at that function to get the control
of the execution. The user has two choices for this diagram: to render all of the calls, or to
render just the calls that are stepped into. When rendering only the calls that are stepped
into, hitting a breakpoint adds that function call from the root. User is used as the root of
the diagram in such cases. An option is also available to trace the inner calls of an imported
function.
Detection of loops and cycles is important in low level system analysis. Loops, in
this context, refer to calls within the same function, and cycles refer to the iterations of a
function call pattern. To detect the loops and cycles, we set up a preference for loop and
cycle count. We use IDA Pro plugin to detect the loops and Tracks viewer to detect the
cycles. To detect loops, every jump address is checked and recorded in the plugin. If there
is more than n jumps occur in the same address and the same function then, plugin detects
it as a loop, where n is the preference for detecting loops. Tracks uses a simple graph
cycle detection algorithm to detect cycles in the trace. The algorithm works on an array
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of strings, where each string is the name of the targetted called function. If the algorithm
detects a cycle, it collapses the diagram and sends a message to the IDA Pro plugin to stop
sending message for the address pattern. The examples of loops and cycles are shown later
in this chapter.
5.2.3 Navigation History
In reverse code analysis of malware, it is important to remember the navigation history
of executing speciﬁc malware. The path or the pattern of an execution helps the user to
reexecute the malware (for the purpose of reexamining a speciﬁc part of the malware)
without consuming long time. This is the reason to preserve the navigation history in
Tracks. Navigation history module is used to keep the track of the navigation history while
using IDA Pro. In one sense, this diagram is similar to the dynamic control ﬂow diagram as
it is generated dynamically when the user navigate the binary using IDA Pro. Navigation
history diagram usesUser as the root of the diagram. When the user ﬁrst selects a function
in IDA Pro, it is added in the diagram as a call from the User lifeline. If the user selects
a function that is cross reference from the corresponding function, it will be added as a
function call from that function. However, if the user selects a function that is not a cross
reference, then, it will be added as a call from the User lifeline. The navigation history
diagram can be saved as a trace to be analyzed later.
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5.2.4 Diagram Features
There are some common features among the three views of Tracks. If we look at the Fig-
ure 5.50, there is a panel at the top of the ﬁgure, which shows the module name where
the function is deﬁned in. We can see in the ﬁgure that the imported function LocalFree
is deﬁned in KERNEL32.dll. When the user selects an imported function, the control ﬂow
data corresponding to the function is parsed and displayed in the pane. Tracks also pro-
vides facilities to trace large systems. If the trace is excessively long, the user can set up
a new root for the trace. This feature is available as an option when right-clicking on the
subroutine’s lifeline. In order to facilitate easy navigation between roots, there is a bread-
crumbs added at the top of the diagram. A thumbnail view is also added at the bottom of
the diagram which helps the user to navigate diagrams easily. For the persistency, we add
an option to save the state of the diagram. When the user completes the analysis session,
he/she can save the state of the diagram for future use. We also provide facilities that are
related to IDA Pro. For example, if the user double clicks on a function call, IDA Pro will
navigate the place where the function is called. This feature assists the analysis in IDA Pro.
There is also a preference to synchronize the navigation with IDA Pro as we step through
the diagram. Lastly, if the user renames a function from IDA Pro, it will be reﬂected in the
opened diagram.
5.2.5 Design and Implementation
In this section, we discuss the design and the implementation of the Tracks sequence di-
agram tool. For the graphical view of Tracks, we extend Dynamic Interactive Views for
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Reverse Engineering (Diver) [92] which is an extensible open-source sequence diagram
tool. First, we try to give a brief overview of Diver followed by a description of Tracks.
Diver: The Sequence Explorer
As we have stated before, to create Tracks, we extend Diver [92] which is built using eclipse
framework [117]. Diver is designed considering two prime perspectives. The ﬁrst is model-
independence and the second is interactivity/navigability. The term model-independence
means the independence of data format usability in the back-end. The viewer can visualize
program control ﬂow from various data sources. The data sources include control ﬂow of
assembly language (our case), dynamic traces from instrumented Java programs [50] and
call structures of static Java source code. Data format independence has been accomplished
by using a framework compatible with the Eclipse JFace [118] viewer framework.
The second feature interactivity/navigability is stimulated considering the fact that se-
quence diagram can become very large and considerably complex. To cope with this issue,
the viewer is equipped with some features like: 1) animated layout, 2) highlighting of se-
lected elements and related sub-calls, 3) grouping of related calls, 4) hiding or collapsing
of call trees and package/module structure, 5) customizable colors and labels for visual
elements such as activation boxes and messages, 6) keyboard navigation through compo-
nents, and 7) the ability to reset (focus) the sequence diagram on different parts of the call
structure. An evaluation of these features is available in [50].
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Tracks
To achieve the functionality of Tracks, we ﬁrst deﬁne the XML data model to contain all
the static and the dynamic control ﬂow information that is extracted from the IDA Pro using
the IDA Pro plugin. On top of this model, we deﬁne our own content and label providers for
the sequence diagrams. For the dynamic control ﬂow and navigation history, we portray
the diagram dynamically, and all dynamically build diagrams are saved in different XML
models as the functions make different calls at different times. The additional functions
that are added in Tracks are: function tree view, cycle detection, marking external calls and
adding custom events, e.g., setting breakpoints.
Tracks also supports multiple instances of IDA Pro simultaneously which is very im-
portant to analyze live processes. For example, when analyzing Mariposa botnet, we need
to analyze two executables concurrently using two instances of IDA Pro as Mariposa in-
jects its functionality into explorer.exe. One instance of IDA Pro is loaded with Mariposa
executable and another instance of IDA Pro is attached with the live winlogon.exe process.
Using Tracks users can also navigate to the proper instance of IDA Pro by double clicking
on an element in Tracks view.
Communication With IDA Pro
In order to retrieve information from IDA Pro, we need to create an IDA Pro plugin that is
able to listen to events and generate the needed data. IDA Pro plugin is written in C++ and
Tracks is written using Java programming language. In order to make the communication
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simple between the two platforms, we use socket communication. All the possible mes-
sages passed between IDA Pro plugin and Tracks is shown in Figure 5.51. The ﬁrst message
from Tracks is to initiate a contact. As a reply, IDA Pro sends back the path to the XML
ﬁle describing the static control ﬂow. Next, Tracks can receive information about events
from IDA Pro regarding navigation, debugging and renaming. This information contains
additional data about the functions like: the index of the call (8 in this case), the function
address, the function name and the ﬁle name (in this case, calc.exe). These messages also
contain the name of the external ﬁle that the function resides in. Tracks is able to send
messages to the plugin to enable/disable tracing messages and to enable/disable tracing
calls within a library module. It is also capable to send messages to count the preference
of the loops to disable tracing for a speciﬁc loop. In order to terminate the communication,
Tracks sends a goodbye message and the plugin replies with another goodbye message.
5.3 Case Study
The primary purpose of Tracks is to improve the visualization features of the low level
systems to ease the analysis process. To demonstrate some of the features of Tracks, we
analyze Mariposa botnet using IDA Pro and Tracks. Our primary objective is to demonstrate
the improved visualization aspects provided by Tracks. We demonstrate how the improved
view of loops, cycles and the pattern of system calls help to understand malware. According
to the discussion in Section 3.3, there are four phases in the reverse engineering of Mariposa
bot. The phases are: obfuscation, decryption, injection and after-injection. In this section,
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Figure 5.51: Communications Between IDA Pro Plugin and Tracks
we show how the improved features of Tracks facilitate the understanding of Mariposa
code. There are two interesting areas of analysis we are emphasizing on; one is detection
of loops/cycles and the other is API call patterns.
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5.3.1 Obfuscation and Decryption
As we have stated before, Mariposa bot starts its execution with a large useless loop. The
purpose of the loop is to confuse analyzers, automatic un-packers and debuggers. The as-
sembly code of this obfuscation is shown in the Figure 3.15 presented in Chapter 3. Tracks
detects this obfuscation as a cycle and the cycle can be seen in the lower left corner of the
Figure 5.52. After this obfuscation, Mariposa transfers its control to the portion of the code
that is responsible to decrypt some parts of the binary to create meaningful machine code.
This decryption routine XORs the data that is located between the addresses 0x41D000 and
0x41D4C0 with the constant 0x0CA1A51E5. Afterwards, Mariposa transfers its control to
the address 0x41D047. The assembly code of the ﬁrst de-obfuscation is shown in Fig-
ure 3.16 presented in Chapter 3. Such loops that occur within a single function are colored
red in the sequence viewer. These loops and cycles can be seen both in Figure 5.52 and






















Figure 5.53: Decryption Loop in Tracks
5.3.2 Injection Phase
One of the features of malicious software is to hide its evil activities inside legitimate
processes. Code injection is a technique used to hide malicious processes inside legitimate
processes and thereby compromise an operating system. It is a challenge for the security
researcher to detect evil code injection. We use the word evil here as some of legitimate
systems also use code injection to conduct their functions. Analyzing system call patterns
can be a good source to detect evil activity. For example, to inject into a process, we
have to ﬁnd the handle of the process, allocate memory inside the virtual address space of
this process and write code into that process. There has been much work done to detect
intrusions based on the sequence of system calls [75, 106]. Information regarding the API
call patterns can be discovered through the sequence viewer. In the present version of
Tracks, user has to detect it manually. However, in future versions, user will be able to
detect it automatically. We observe some of the API call patterns that are used in the
injection process of Mariposa.
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5.3.3 Injection Preparation
Mariposa injects code into explorer.exe as we have described in Section 3.3.4. As a prepa-
ration for the injection, Mariposa organizes the data to be injected. Afterwards, Mariposa
looks for the process to inject into it using the library functions: CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,
Process32First and Process32Next. The assembly code of calling the Process32Next func-
tion is shown in Figure 5.54. As we can see, the function is called using callecx instruction.
However, since the address of the function is stored in the register, we only see what the
call is when we debug it and step through the call. This information can easily be seen from
sequence diagram, as shown in Figure 5.55.
Stack[000015E0]:0013591F loc_13591F:
Stack[000015E0]:0013591F
Stack[000015E0]:0013591F lea ecx, [ebp+var_128]
Stack[000015E0]:00135925 push ecx
Stack[000015E0]:00135926 mov edx, [ebp+var_134]
Stack[000015E0]:0013592C push edx
Stack[000015E0]:0013592D mov eax, [ebp+var_12C]
Stack[000015E0]:00135933 mov ecx, [eax+6Ch]
Stack[000015E0]:00135936 call ecx
Stack[000015E0]:00135938 test eax, eax
Stack[000015E0]:0013593A jnz loc_135899





















After retrieving the desired process handler, Mariposa uses VirtualAllocEx function to al-
locate space in the process. Once Mariposa allocates virtual memory space, it uses the
NtWriteVirtualMemory function in order to write into the allocated space. Figure 5.56
shows the sequence of function calls. As we have described before in Section 3.3.4, Mari-
posa injects code into ﬁve different places of explorer.exe, but for the convenience, we show
the sequence for one injection in Figure 5.56.
Figure 5.56: Code Injection Traces
5.3.5 After Injection
Throughout our research on Mariposa, we patch the Mariposa binary so that instead of
injecting into explorer.exe, it injects into winlogon.exe. The reason doing such is, analyzing
a live explorer.exe process is very hard and it often freezes the whole system. On the other
hand, working with winlogon.exe is easier comparatively.
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Some of the major post injection functions include: creation of mutex, changing ﬁle
system, changing registry, initiation of network communication and communicating with
the C&C server. Figure 5.57 shows the call sequence regarding the registry operations in
Mariposa whereas Figure 5.58 illustrates the call sequence used in Mariposa in order to
communicate with the C&C server.
5.4 Analysis
There have been very few research proposals handled the visualization of the control ﬂow
for low-level systems. One noticeable tool is Visualization of Executable for Reversing and
Analysis (VERA) [99]. VERA provides a high-level dynamic view of basic blocks, loops
and color coding in order to support dynamic analysis. It also provides some navigation
links to IDA Pro. In contrast, Tracks provides three separate views of control ﬂow in the
form of conceptual sequence diagrams that support function names, calls and API calls.
Another control ﬂow tool is Code Bubbles [53], which is an IDE for Java to create
bubble groups where each bubble contains code for a method. Code Bubbles includes
static call graphs, navigation support and also a debugger. However, while many of the
features of Code Bubbles are useful, it focuses primarily on the code within the bubbles.
There is no view in Code Bubbles that contains just the calls. Moreover, it does not focus
on extremely large traces which we are existent within assembly code.







Static control ﬂow with local
functions only. No search or
navigation capability.
Static or dynamic control ﬂow
with both local and external
functions. Functions can be lo-
cated through a tree view.
Loop and
recursion
No call ordering and no
indication if call is made more
than once
Shows the order of calls, includ-
ing each time a call is made.









No support. No support.
Branch
frequency




No support. Can merge call paths into one
Tracks diagram from multiple
IDA Pro instances.
Table 5.4: IDA Pro and Tracks Comparison
based on the way how each tool addresses some features. Tracks provides relatively bet-
ter visualization in order to reduce cognitive overhead by better supporting navigation and
allowing zoom/collapse interaction with visual cues. Additionally, added features inte-
grated into this visual framework advances the state-of-the-art without increasing cognitive
overhead. Moreover, Data availability for some features, e.g., trace comparing and branch























































We have introduced in this chapter Tracks sequence viewer. The goal of our work is to
develop a tool and to assist the reverse engineering process in cyber security. Relative to
existing tools in this domain, our tool introduces additional features including dynamic
tracing, loop and cycle detection and navigational aid. Our eventual target with Tracks is
to run the executable with the sequence viewer open and investigates the entire call graph
afterwards. This is sometimes impossible because of several anti-debugging traps used in
malware. Since we cannot single step over the code, the user needs some prior knowledge
to analyze the malware properly using the sequence viewer. We hope that new anti-anti-




This chapter concludes the thesis. First, we give a summary of the contributions, then we
describe the research directions that can be conducted as a future work.
6.1 Summary
The perspective of the malware has changed from fun to organized crime. Malware fa-
cilitates the evil power of software for several malevolence activities including DDoS ex-
tortions, identity theft, click-fraud and many more. The central control of an evil software
equipped with malevolent capabilities imposes serious threats to the Internet world. Bot-
nets equipped with sophisticated techniques like polymorphism, metamorphism and several
hiding techniques can impose severe threat for the Internet users. Considering the fact, it
is mandatory for the security researchers to understand the inner workings of the modern
types of malwares especially botnets.
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TheMariposa toolkit is one of the most prominent botnet technologies that is being used
nowadays. Capabilities like, code injection, spreading mechanism, information stealing,
DDoS makes the botnet worthwhile to analyze. The Zeus crimeware toolkit is an advanced
tool to control and run a botnet. The integrated tootkit is designed effectively to evade
host level anti-virus detection. On the other side, the use of encrypted HTTP trafﬁc makes
it difﬁcult to detect and analyze in the network level. Moreover, the multiple levels of
malware obfuscation and mass process infection present a burden for the analysts of the
botnet.
In this thesis, we have analyzed Mariposa and Zeus botnet using reverse engineering
techniques. We have uncovered all the obfuscations and decryptions presented in the bot
binary. We have also described how code injection techniques are exploited by botnets
to hide their evil activities inside legitimate processes. We have also provide scripts to
automatically extract valuable information from the bot binary. Our general observation is
that botnets are becoming blended threats since they combine the capabilities of worms,
viruses and trojan horses. From this exercise, we have learned that some sequences of
API calls can be a good source to detect nefarious bot activities. For instance, a process
that generally does not need to access P2P registry entries does so by calling some API
functions can be suspicious. Finally, the rise of UDP trafﬁc in a network can give a clue
about the presence of a Mariposa infection in this network.
Reverse code engineering is a very complex and time consuming task. Because of
the lack of suitable visualization tools, the task becomes more hectic. In order to ﬁnd
out the most important beacons of malware analysis regarding the visualization, we have
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conducted a survey on 15 practitioners in the corresponding domain. In response to that
survey, we have developed Tracks which leverages progressive user interface techniques
to improve support for control ﬂow analysis. Relative to state-of-the-art tools such as IDA
Pro, Tracks introduces additional features including dynamic tracing, navigational aids,
loop and cycle detection and integration with IDA Pro functionality. Our analysis reveals
the ways in which research in the cyber security community can be enhanced through the
adaptation of visualization techniques and interactive user interfaces in the analysis of low-
level systems.
6.2 Future Work
For future work, we intend to reverse engineer other bots that are of interest to the security
community. In addition, we will target to work on a framework for the automatic analysis,
naming and classiﬁcation of malware. There are many dimensions for the future works
related with Tracks and visualization. For the sequence viewer, we determine six areas to
work: 1) recognizing API call patterns, 2) documentation, 3) showing reversed control ﬂow,
4) comparing traces, 5) collecting data required to reach execution points and 6) detecting
branch frequency. API call patterns combined with other features can be a good source
to determine the malicious nature of executables. Regarding documentation, we feel that
when analyzing complex binary, it is important to take notes within the tool and preserve it
for future use. Reversed control path can help analyzing malicious software. It can help by
providing information on how to reach a speciﬁc portion of code. Comparing two traces
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to see how the program executes differently from one run to the next is very important.
Finally, branch frequency would indicate how often some code is executed which can be
helpful to locate performance bottlenecks. Throughout the malware analysis process, user
needs to reset the debugging process. Sometimes, user needs to restart the whole process
from the beginning. The way to ﬁnd out the proper debugging steps is a tedious and a
time-consuming job mainly because of the obfuscation and the anti-debugging traps. Even
with all the steps known, one has to be extremely careful in rerunning the malware. A state
diagram that reruns the software automatically to a predeﬁned state such as the injection
state in case of Mariposa, can be very helpful to save time and effort.
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Appendix
Listing 6.1: Library Functions Used in Mariposa Botnet
1 debug068:01620000 dd offset user32_MessageBoxA
2 debug068:01620004 dd offset user32_RegisterDeviceNotificationA
3 debug068:01620008 dd offset user32_DefWindowProcA
4 debug068:0162000C dd offset user32_RegisterClassExA
5 debug068:01620010 dd offset user32_CreateWindowExA
6 debug068:01620014 dd offset user32_DestroyWindow
7 debug068:01620018 dd offset user32_UnregisterClassA
8 debug068:0162001C dd offset user32_UnregisterDeviceNotification
9 debug068:01620020 dd offset user32_PeekMessageA
10 debug068:01620024 dd offset user32_DispatchMessageA
11 debug068:01620028 dd offset user32_wsprintfA
12 debug068:0162002C dd offset kernel32_LoadLibraryA
13 debug068:01620030 dd offset kernel32_GetModuleFileNameA
14 debug068:01620034 dd offset kernel32_CopyFileA
15 debug068:01620038 dd offset kernel32_CreateFileA
16 debug068:0162003C dd offset kernel32_CloseHandle
17 debug068:01620040 dd offset kernel32_ReadFile
18 debug068:01620044 dd offset kernel32_GetFileSize
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19 debug068:01620048 dd offset kernel32_WriteFile
20 debug068:0162004C dd offset kernel32_LocalAlloc
21 debug068:01620050 dd offset kernel32_LocalFree
22 debug068:01620054 dd offset kernel32_LocalSize
23 debug068:01620058 dd offset kernel32_GetTickCount
24 debug068:0162005C dd offset kernel32_GetCommandLineA
25 debug068:01620060 dd offset kernel32_GetLocalTime
26 debug068:01620064 dd offset kernel32_CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
27 debug068:01620068 dd offset kernel32_Process32First
28 debug068:0162006C dd offset kernel32_Process32Next
29 debug068:01620070 dd offset kernel32_OpenProcess
30 debug068:01620074 dd offset kernel32_VirtualAllocEx
31 debug068:01620078 dd offset kernel32_CreateRemoteThread
32 debug068:0162007C dd offset kernel32_lstrlen
33 debug068:01620080 dd offset kernel32_lstrcat
34 debug068:01620084 dd offset kernel32_lstrcmp
35 debug068:01620088 dd offset kernel32_lstrcmpi
36 debug068:0162008C dd offset kernel32_lstrcpyn
37 debug068:01620090 dd offset kernel32_WaitForSingleObject
38 debug068:01620094 dd offset kernel32_CreateMutexA
39 debug068:01620098 dd offset kernel32_CreateThread
40 debug068:0162009C dd offset kernel32_ExitThread
41 debug068:016200A0 dd offset kernel32_Sleep
42 debug068:016200A4 dd offset kernel32_CreateDirectoryA
43 debug068:016200A8 dd offset kernel32_GetLastError
44 debug068:016200AC dd offset kernel32_SetFileAttributesA
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45 debug068:016200B0 dd offset kernel32_DeleteFileA
46 debug068:016200B4 dd offset kernel32_GetSystemDirectoryA
47 debug068:016200BC dd offset kernel32_CreateProcessA
48 debug068:016200C0 dd offset kernel32_GetEnvironmentVariableA
49 debug068:016200C4 dd offset kernel32_GetModuleHandleA
50 debug068:016200C8 dd offset kernel32_GetVersionExA
51 debug068:016200CC dd offset kernel32_GetTempPathA
52 debug068:016200D0 dd offset kernel32_ExitProcess
53 debug068:016200D4 dd offset kernel32_VirtualProtectEx
54 debug068:016200D8 dd offset kernel32_CreateNamedPipeA
55 debug068:016200DC dd offset kernel32_ConnectNamedPipe
56 debug068:016200E0 dd offset kernel32_DuplicateHandle
57 debug068:016200E4 dd offset kernel32_GetCurrentProcess
58 debug068:016200E8 dd offset kernel32_DisconnectNamedPipe
59 debug068:016200EC dd offset kernel32_GetLocaleInfoA
60 debug068:016200F0 dd offset kernel32_PeekNamedPipe
61 debug068:016200F4 dd offset kernel32_CreatePipe
62 debug068:016200F8 dd offset ntdll_NtWriteVirtualMemory
63 debug068:016200FC dd offset advapi32_RegCreateKeyExA
64 debug068:01620100 dd offset advapi32_RegSetValueExA
65 debug068:01620104 dd offset advapi32_RegCloseKey
66 debug068:01620108 dd offset advapi32_RegDeleteValueA
67 debug068:0162010C dd offset advapi32_RegOpenKeyA
68 debug068:01620110 dd offset advapi32_GetUserNameA
69 debug068:01620114 dd offset advapi32_RegQueryValueExA
70 debug068:01620118 dd offset ws2_32_WSAStartup
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71 debug068:0162011C dd offset ws2_32_socket
72 debug068:01620120 dd offset ws2_32_inet_ntoa
73 debug068:01620124 dd offset ws2_32_inet_addr
74 debug068:01620128 dd offset ws2_32_htons
75 debug068:01620130 dd offset ws2_32_sendto
76 debug068:01620134 dd offset ws2_32_recvfrom
77 debug068:01620138 dd offset ws2_32_closesocket
78 debug068:0162013C dd offset ws2_32_ioctlsocket
79 debug068:01620140 dd offset ws2_32_gethostbyname
80 debug068:01620144 dd offset ws2_32_getsockname
81 debug068:01620148 dd offset ws2_32_send
82 debug068:0162014C dd offset ws2_32_gethostname
83 debug068:01620150 dd offset ws2_32_connect
84 debug068:01620154 dd offset ws2_32_select
85 debug068:01620158 dd offset ws2_32_htonl
86 debug068:0162015C dd offset ws2_32_htonl
87 debug068:01620160 dd offset ws2_32_recv
88 debug068:01620164 dd offset ws2_32_setsockopt
89 debug068:01620168 dd offset ws2_32_WSARecv
90 debug068:0162016C dd offset ws2_32_getnameinfo
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